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The U.S. textile and apparel industries employed approximately
two and a half million people in 1950.1 Since then, the industries have
lost close to one million jobs, of which 857,000 have been lost since
1970.2 Competition from imported goods has contributed significantly
to the decline.' Now the U.S. textile and apparel industries face the
specter of accelerated job loss due to the "Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing" (ATC)4 - a product of the Uruguay Round of GATT nego-
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; Masters of Management
Candidate, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, 1997. I would like to thank John
McDonald, Jay Venzon, Allison Wing Takahashi, and L'Andra Branan for their comments.
1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1 EMPLOYMENT, HOURS,
AND EARNINGS, UNrIED STATES, 1909-90 465, 506 (1991).
2 Compare id. with U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, The Em-
ployment Situation: August 1996, USDL 96-365, Table B-1 (visited September 23, 1996) <ftp:#l
stats.bls.gov/pub/news.release/emsit.txt> [hereinafter Employment Situation].
3 Lane S. Hurewitz, Textiles, in TBE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTiATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) 259, 297 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
4 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
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tiations5 - which calls for the phasing out of import quota limitations
in the textile and apparel industries.
6
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 85, 86-90 (GAIT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter
ATC]. See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text for related U.S. job loss projections.
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) is a multilateral agreement which
governs international trade. Ruth E. Olson, Note, GATT- The Legal Application of Safeguards
in the Context of Regional Trade Arrangements and its Implications for the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1488 (1989). The GAIT originated in 1947 as an at-
tachment to the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. The
agreement has subsequently been amended on numerous occasions. U.S. DEPArMENT OF
STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. IN FORCE ON JAN. 1, 1995 (1995); see General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (hereinafter
GATT 1947).
The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations was a seven year effort. It produced significant
results, including the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide an insti-
tutional framework for managing trade relations among its members. Amelia Porges, Introduc-
tory Note, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, 33 I.L.M. 1, 2 (1994). The WTO Agreement includes several legal instruments annexed to
the WTO agreement, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)
and the ATC. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 143, 1153 (1994)(hereinafter Final Act); see also Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. II, para. 2, Annex 1A, re-
printed in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNTIED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TExTs OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATE-
MENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No.
316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1337 (1994) (hereinafter IMPLEMENTING BILL). While GAIT 1994 is
legally distinct from GATT 1947, GATT 1994 includes and is essentially based on the prior
GATT agreement. Id., at 659, 660. The WTO will operate in much the same manner as the
former GAIT arrangement, but will oversee a wider variety of trade agreements and will utilize
improved decision-making procedures. Id. at 659.
As of August 1, 1995 one hundred countries (including the United States) had accepted the
Uruguay round agreements and become members of the WTO. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION, 2 GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 1151 (6th ed. 1995).
In conformity with the Final Act's terminology, the author will refer to GAIT 1947 where
appropriate, but will also use the term GAIT when referring to the multilateral trading system
that has evolved under the GAIT 1947 arrangement.
6 See infra notes 24 to 43 and accompanying text. Developing nations, on the other hand,
view the ATC's requirement of the gradual elimination of quotas as an opportunity to build their
countries' textile and apparel industries thereby boosting employment. Consequently, adminis-
tration of the ATC is a source of political conflict between the United States (and other devel-
oped countries) and developing countries. Cf Frances Williams, World Trade Fruits Fail to
Ripen - Poor Nations Have Yet to See Benefits from Accord, FIN. TIMms, Jan. 10, 1996, World
Trade News Section, at 4.
Developing nations seek to develop their textile and apparel industries because the machin-
ery involved is not too complex and because clothing is a basic necessity for the domestic mar-
ket. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 182 (1989). Also, clothing industries are often a large part of national
economies and can employ many people. Consequently, they are important to developed and
developing nations and are politically significant. See id.
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To mitigate the risk to the United States and other developed
countries' textile and apparel industries, the ATC contains a transi-
tional safeguard provision which allows importing countries to impose
quotas during the phase-out period on unrestricted imports which
cause "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof"'7 to a domestic in-
dustry. A transitional safeguard provides an adjustment period which
buffers the adverse impact of sharply rising imports on the affected
domestic group.8 The limited reprieve allows workers and owners an
opportunity to adjust to changing economic conditions.
Primary responsibility for regulating the use of transitional safe-
guards during the phase-out period falls on the Textile Monitoring
Body (TMB), a body created by the ATC.9 The TMB faces a signifi-
cant challenge in carrying out this duty because the ATC does not
define "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof." The difficulty of
the TMB's task is compounded by the fact that the TMB, which must
reach decisions by consensus, has members from both developing
countries - which typically favor liberal trade in the textile and ap-
parel industries - and developed countries - which typically favor re-
strictions on trade in these sectors.10 In the event that countries
involved in a transitional safeguard dispute are dissatisfied with deci-
sions by the TMB, the countries can appeal TMB decisions to the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).11
This Comment will demonstrate that the "serious damage" or
"actual threat thereof" standard does not currently provide a predict-
able rule of decision and that the TMB must develop the standard in a
common law manner in order for it to assume a consistent, non-polit-
7 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 2.
8 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b) (1994)(domestic safeguards are intended to facilitate a positive ad-
justment of the domestic industry, which includes (1) enabling the domestic industry to better
compete with imports after the safeguard is removed, (2) providing for an orderly transfer of
resources to other productive pursuits, and (3) assisting an orderly transition of dislocated work-
ers to productive pursuits); Cf JACKSON, supra note 6, at 15-17, 148-53. Jackson also recognizes
that transitional safeguards may exist primarily because of the political power of well organized
special interest. Id. at 150-53. However, regardless of whether the economic adjustment or the
special interest theory better explains why safeguards exist, safeguards should have the effect of
providing a buffer and spreading the burden of economic adjustment.
For a scathing assessment of the motivations for and economic consequences of safeguards,
see Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard". A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape
Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991) (discounting economic moti-
vations for and benefits of safeguards and explaining the existence of safeguards with public
choice theory).
9 ATC, supra note 4, art. 8.
10 See generally Williams, supra, note 6.
11 Id.
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ical meaning. Part I of this paper provides an overview of the trade
regime which has governed textile and apparel trade over the past
thirty years and the poor performance of the U.S. textile and apparel
industries during that period. Part II summarizes key components of
the new trade regime provided by the ATC and discusses the potential
- primarily adverse - impact of the agreement on the U.S. industries.
Part I describes the transitional safeguard, the dispute settlement
procedure, and the transitional safeguard cases decided by the TMB
to date. Part IV analyzes the cases decided to date and concludes that
the serious damage standard as articulated by the ATC and applied by
the TMB is unacceptably vague and subject to politically motivated
interpretations. Part V recommends changes in the TMB's operating
procedures which will facilitate development of a meaningful defini-
tion of "serious damage," thereby increasing the predictability and
political neutrality of TMB decisions.
I. HISTORICAL TEXTILE TRADE AND U.S.
INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
A. The Managed Trade Regime
Management of international textile and apparel trade has histor-
ically operated outside of the general principles of GATT, including
the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (i.e., quotas) in GATT Ar-
ticle X.12 Instead, since the 1960s, the international textile and ap-
parel market has been governed by multilateral and bilateral
agreements between countries.
The first multilateral agreement was the "Short Term Arrange-
ment," entered into in 1961. It was followed by a "Long Term Ar-
rangement," which was in effect from 1962 through 1973.13 In 1973,
the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (the Mul-
tiFiber Agreement or MFA) was signed by over thirty parties includ-
ing the major textile suppliers to the United States such as India,
12 David J. Weiler and Allyson L. Senie, The Commerce Department Speaks on International
Trade and Investment 1994: International Rules of the Textile and Apparel Trade Regime, 864
PLI/CoRp. 505,507 (1994). However, the departure from GATT principles has been sanctioned
by GA'TT, as trade arrangements have been negotiated under the auspices of GATr. Id. at 507-
08.
Quantitative restrictions refer to quotas, which impose limits on the total amount of imports
which a country will accept, as opposed to tariffs which impose a duty (sometimes so high as to
make trade prohibitive) on items but set no explicit limit on the amount of imports.
13 It. These agreements were primarily a response by the United States and Great Britain to
the increased textile production capabilities of then newly developed countries such as Japan,
Hong Kong, India, and Pakistan. John S. McPhee, Agriculture and Textiles: The Fare and Fabric
of Current GATT Negotiations, 3 IND. INT'L & Comp. L REV. 155, 161 (1992).
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Hong Kong, and China.14 The MFA provided a general framework
and guiding principles under which countries reached bilateral agree-
ments on quota levels and imposed unilateral quota restraints on a
product-by-product basis.15 Prior to the creation of the WTO and the
ATC in 1994, the MFA governed an estimated 65 to 70 percent of the
$200 billion (U.S. dollars) world textile trade.
16
The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations produced the ATC,
which calls for the phasing out of the quotas under the MFA and for
the integration of textiles into GATT 1994 over a ten-year period.' 7
The ATC will bring an end to 30 years of managed trade in the textile
industry.
B. Historical U.S. Textile and Apparel Industry Performance
Despite the protection afforded by quotas negotiated or imposed
under the MFA and other forms of protection such as tariffs, imported
products have captured an increasing amount of the U.S. market. Be-
tween the introduction of the MFA in 1973 and 1994, there were jobs
lost in the U.S. textile and apparel industries (see Table I). These job
losses were due primarily to increased imports and technological ad-
vancements in production.'" Textile companies also suffered sub-par
profitability during this period.19
Nevertheless, the U.S. textile industry would likely have seen
even greater declines if it were not for U.S. trade relief.20 In theory,
protection from imports increases the potential for future profitability
and, consequently, induces investment in the protected industry. In-
creases in investment, research and development, productivity, and
new product offerings of the domestic textile and apparel industries
since 1980 support this theory.21 The United States now has one of
14 Weiler and Senie, supra note 12, at 508. India and Hong Kong are also WTO Members;
China is not a WTO Member. See WTO Nominates Committee Heads at First Session of General
Council, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), (Feb. 1, 1995), at d7 [hereinafter WTO Nominates].
The MFA extended trade regulations to manufactured fiber products and wool as well as
cotton. Subsequent extensions of the original MFA have further expanded coverage to vegeta-
ble fibers and silk blends. Weiler and Senie, supra note 12, at 507.
15 Weiler and Senie, supra note 12, at 508-09.
16 McPhee, supra note 13, at 167.
17 Weiler and Senie, supra note 12, at 519. See infra notes 24 to 43 and accompanying text.
18 Hurewitz, supra note 3, at 298.
19 See id.; AMERICAN Tnxr=E MANuFAcrURERs INsTrrtTE, TEXTLE HiLsoirs: Tim
QuARTERLY ECONOMIC REviaw oF TmE TExrLa INDusTRY 13 (September 1994)(hereinafter
ATMI -hLIGHTs).
20 See Alan Tonelson, Beating Back Predatory Trade, FOREIGN AxRAims, July/August 1994,
at 123.
21 Id. at 131-33.
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TABLE I: ECONOMIC TRENDS N TE TEXTILE AND APPAREL
INDUSTRIES DURING THE MULTI-FIBER ARRANGEMENT
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Domestic Employment: (a)
Apparel 1,310 1,234 1,115 1,008 847
Textile 919 835 699 674 673
Total 2,229 2,069 1,814 1,682 1,520
Import Penetration Percentage: (b)
Apparel (c) 14.5 18.9 30.3 37.0 43.4
Non-Apparel Textiles 3.8 4.7 16.3 19.2 28.2
Total Textiles (d) 14.2 16.8 33.4 40.0 49.8
(a) In thousands. 1975-1985 figures are from supra note 1. 1990 figures are from U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, Aug. 1992, at
97,104 (1992). 1994 figures are from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 43
EMPLOYMENT AND EARN NGS, Jan. 1996, at 50 (1996).
(b) Underlying data in square meter equivalents. ATMI -ILInrs, supra note 19 at 24.
(c) Apparel figures herein include only imported finished garments and do not reflect imported
fabric that went into domestically produced apparel. See id.
(d) Includes non-apparel textiles, finished garments, and an estimated percentage of fabric and
yam imports that went into domestically produced apparel. See id.
the world's most efficient textile industries.22 While job and market
share losses have continued, increased efficiency resulting from invest-
ment has helped in preserving companies and jobs in the United
States.23 Import quotas have arguably helped to make these improve-
ments in the U.S. industries possible. However, this protection will be
phased out under the ATC.
II. THE NEW ORDER AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE U.S.
TEXTILE AND APPAREL INDUSTRIES
A. Overview of the ATC
The ATC calls for increased market access for textile and apparel
trade and for the integration of textile and apparel products into the
GATT 1994 regime over a ten-year period. Prominent features of the
ATC include the gradual and complete elimination of quotas, in-
creased market access requirements, stronger means of enforcement
of quotas during the phase-out period, the provision of a transitional
safeguard measure for the temporary protection of domestic indus-
tries from increased imports, and the establishment of the TMB to
oversee implementation of the agreement.24
22 UNITED STATFS INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIssiON, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY AND INDUSTmIES OF THE GATI URUGUAY RouND AOREEMENTS, Vol. 1, Ch. 25, IV-
10 (June 1994) (hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACT).
23 See Tonelson, supra note 20, at 123.
24 See IMPLEMENTING BiLL, supra note 5, at 764-67.
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The most significant provision of the ATC is Article 2 which calls
for a phase-out of quotas through: (a) the gradual integration of all
textile items into GATT 1994, thereby eliminating the quotas on these
items, (b) growth in quota levels prior to each item's integration into
GAIT 1994, and (c) the prohibition of new quotas.25 Products are to
be integrated into GAT 1994 in three stages, resulting in 51% of all
products listed in the Annex of the ATC being integrated within ap-
proximately seven years of the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement and the remaining 49% being integrated in year ten.26
Products not yet integrated into GATT 1994 and subject to quotas are
to have annual quota growth rates accelerated.27 Integration and







Stage Starting Date Integrated Rates
1 Date of Entry Into Force of WTO Agreement 16 16
2 37 Months After Above Date 17 25
3 85 Months After Above Date 18 27
4 121 Months After Above Date All Remaining N/A
All restrictions between WTO members (Members) in place
before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement are to be governed
25 ATC, supra note 4, art. 2. New quotas are permitted in limited circumstances by the ATC
and relevant GATT 1994 provisions. I& art. 2, para. 4.
26 ld. art. 2, paras. 6, 8.
27 Id. art. 2, para. 13-14. For example, if a quota growth rate of I percent per annum existed
for a product pursuant to a bilateral agreement reached under the MFA, then the growth rate of
the quota would be 1.16 percent per annum during the first phase of the transition period. Wei-
ler and Senie, supra note 12, at 533.
Historically, quotas in the textile and apparel industries have generally had 6 percent per
annum growth rates. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 182.
28 ATC, supra note 4, art. 2. The WTO entered into force on January 1, 1995. Catherine
Curtiss & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, United States-Latin American Trade Laws, 21 N.C. J. INr'
L. & Comm. REG. 111, 114 (1995).
Importing nations have discretion in selecting which items to integrate at different stages.
POTENT AL IMPACT, supra note 22. The United States has deferred the integration of seventy
percent of imports by value to the end of the transition period which contributes to exporters
concerns that, despite the language of the ATC, the United States will attempt to extend the
quota system. Williams, supra note 6. However, the quota growth acceleration provided by the
ATC will arguably increase the amount of quota availability prior to final integration of all items
to such an extent that the impact of final integration on the U.S. industry may be only marginal.
Jim Ostroff, TMB Verdicts: Are The Scales Off Balance?, WoMEN's WEAR DAILY, Oct. 24,1995,
at 5.
29 The acceleration of quota growth will be advanced by one stage for countries that
accounted for 1.2 percent or less of an importing country's total quotas. ATC supra note 4, art.
2, para. 18.
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by the ATC.30 No new restrictions in terms of either products or
Members are allowed to be implemented except as provided by the
ATC or relevant GATT provisions.3' The ATC and all restrictions
thereunder are to be terminated ten years after the WTO Agreement
enters into effect, at which time textiles and clothing will be fully inte-
grated into GATE 1994.32 There are to be no extensions of the
ATC.33
The ATC also requires Members to increase market access to tex-
tile and clothing products by cutting and binding34 tariffs, reducing or
eliminating non-tariff barriers, and facilitating customs, administra-
tive, and licensing procedures35 The ATC does not quantify market
access requirements. However, it states that if a Member believes it is
not being afforded market access in conformance with article 7, para.
1 of the ATC, it can bring the matter before the relevant WTO body.36
For countries that are found to have failed to improve market access,
the accelerated quota growth rates called for in stages two and three
may be denied.37
While the ATC provides for the eventual removal of all quotas, it
also calls for countries to abide by quotas in the interim period. The
ATC states that circumvention of quotas by "transshipment, re-rout-
ing, false declaration concerning country or place of origin, and falsifi-
cation of official documents" frustrates the implementation of the
ATC.38 Members are to establish the necessary legal provisions and
administrative procedures to address circumvention and are to consult
30 Id. art. 2, para. 1. The ATC requires all quantitative restrictions included in pre-existing
bilateral agreements to be disclosed to the WTO. Id
31 Id. art. 2, para. 4.
32 Only WTO signatories benefit. Therefore, China and Taiwan - the two largest textile and
apparel suppliers to the United States - will not necessarily have quotas increased. POTENTIAL
ImpAcr, supra note 22, at IV-6. However, China may join the WTO in the near term. See WTO
Nominates, supra note 14.
33 ATC, supra note 4, art. 9.
34 Id. art. 7, para. 1. A bound rate of duty is a legally negotiated rate which obligates the
country to pay compensation or face possible retaliation if the ceiling rate is exceeded. PoTEN-
TIAL meACr, supra note 22, at IV-7 n.11.
35 Many developing countries maintain market access barriers, including the prohibition of
imports of textiles and apparel, by relying on the GATr balance of payments exceptions. Arti-
cles XII and XVIII of the GATT allow import restrictions to compensate for a serious decline in
monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in reserves, and for purposes of
development in unusual circumstances, in contravention of normal GAIT principles. POTENTIAL
ImpAcr, supra note 22, at IV-7. These exceptions could presumably allow developing countries
to maintain restriction on textile imports despite ATC art. 7.
36 ATC, supra note 4, art. 7, para. 3.
37 Id. art. 8, para. 12.
38 Id. art. 5, para. 1.
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with the Member(s) concerned when circumvention is suspected.39 If
investigation reveals sufficient evidence of circumvention, a Member
may take action including the introduction of restraints with respect to
the circumventing Member's products.40 Either party may refer the
matter to the TMB for review and recommendations.
41
As discussed in detail in part III of this comment, the ATC allows
Members to apply a transitional safeguard - a temporary quota - if a
product that is not already under any form of quota restraint is im-
ported from a Member country (or countries) in such increased quan-
tities as to cause "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof" to a
domestic industry.42 The TMB has the authority and responsibility to
review applications of the transitional safeguard provision.
43
B. Potentially Dramatic Impact of the ATC on the Textile and
Apparel Industries
The textile and apparel industries and their workers are notable
among the industry sectors expected to bear the costs of economic
adjustment resulting from the Uruguay Round Agreements (URA).4
The Industry Sector Advisory Committee (ISAC) for the textile and
apparel sector indicated that the ATC will result in increased imports
and a corresponding 50% to 60% decline in U.S. textile and apparel
production.45 According to the United States International Trade
Commission (USITC), an increase in textile imports of 5% to 15% is
expected to overshadow a 1% to 5% increase in exports, resulting in a
decline in U.S. textile production and employment.46 An increase of
39 Id art. 5, para. 2-3. If circumvention is alleged Members are to cooperate fully, "consis-
tent with their domestic laws and procedures," in investigating the matter. Id. art. 5, para. 3.
40 Id art. 5, para. 4.
41 Id
42 Id. art. 6, para. 2.
43 Id. art. 8, para. 1.
44 Implementation Issues Concerning the World Trade Org.: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Trade of the House Ways and Means Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996)(prepared
statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director International Relations and Trade Issues
National Security and International Affairs Division)(hereinafter Hecker Statement), available
in 1996 WL 5509707.
Liberalization of textile trade will likely benefit exporting nations, U.S. consumers, and U.S.
exporters of other products. However, these gains will likely come at a high price to the U.S.
textile and apparel industries. The purpose of this section is to indicate what the price will be in
order to give perspective on the importance and contentiousness of the "serious damage" case
decisions by the TMB.
45 POTENnAL IMPACT, supra note 22, at IV-7.
46 The USITC model projects a "negligible" decline in textile employment and production,
but this model inexplicably does not factor in the significant effect that the ATC is expected to
have on the U.S. apparel industry, which constitutes 37% of the fiber produced domestically. See
280
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over 15% of apparel imports is expected to significantly exceed
growth in exports leading to modest reductions in production and em-
ployment.4 7 The U.S. consumer is expected to benefit by a small
amount from lower prices and greater product diversity.48
1. The Apparel Industry
Between 1964 and 1994, 50% of the world's apparel production
capacity moved from developed to developing countries. 49 Between
1984 and 1994, apparel imports into the United States grew by 90% to
approximately 43% of the U.S. market despite significant tariff and
quota restrictions.50  Developing countries, mainly in Asia, supply
90% of U.S. apparel imports.51 The URA will stimulate further in-
vestment in apparel production in low wage countries and, thus, im-
ports from developing nations.52 In a joint submission, four apparel
manufacturer associations stated that the URA would accelerate im-
port penetration and threatened to eliminate 33% to 75% of the do-
mestic apparel production.53 The USITC estimated only "modest"
job loss in the apparel sector.5 4
id. at IV-10. The USITC estimates that because of the impact of the U.S. apparel market, the
U.S. textile industry will experience a small decline in employment and production. Id. at IV-12.
47 Id. The textile and apparel sector will benefit from the URA's increased protection of
trade-related intellectual property rights which should curtail pirating of garment designs, labels,
and trademarks. Ld. U.S. textile and apparel firms should likely see increases in exports which
could be increased if countries which have essentially banned apparel imports through tariffs or
quotas allow even limited access. However, India is the only developing country with essentially
closed markets that has a significant enough middle class and disposable income level to provide
a meaningful market for U.S. apparel. IdL
48 Id. Wholesalers and retailers support the phase-out of the MFA. The National Retail
Federation noted that the URA would reduce the costs of clothing, widen the selection of ap-
parel products, increase competitiveness of manufacturing industries that use textile inputs, and
eliminate the welfare costs of the MFA quotas. Id. Some estimate the costs per consumer of
U.S. protection of the textile and apparel industries to be as high as $238. JACKSON, supra note
6, at 183.
49 POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 22, at IV-14.
50 Id. The United States had quotas on apparel imports from 41 developing countries, which
supplied about 70% of apparel imports in 1993. Id. at IV-5.
51 Id. at IV-14.
52 Id. at IV-15.
53 Id. at IV-7. The ISAC indicated that larger U.S. apparel manufacturers may also use facto-
ries abroad in order to compete with the low wage imported competition. Id. The ISAC also
expressed concern that agreements on anti-dumping and subsidies and countervailing measures
could have a detrimental impact on the U.S. textile and apparel industries due to the de minimus
margins established therein. Many textile and apparel products are highly price sensitive, and
the industry group noted that the 2-3% de minimus standards allowed in the URA could give
foreign producers which dumped goods or were subsidized within the de minimus range an ad-
vantage over U.S. producers. Id. at IV-7.
54 Id. at IV-12.
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In the 18 months since the signing of the ATC, apparel jobs have
declined by 10.7%.55 While this figure suggests that the ATC has been
significantly detrimental to the domestic industry, increased automa-
tion, a soft retail market, and other business factors may also have
affected the decline.
2. The Textile Industry
The U.S. textile industry is expected to fare better than the ap-
parel industry under the URA.56 The U.S. textile industry is one of
the world's largest and most efficient producers of textile mill prod-
ucts. United States textile manufacturers have high levels of produc-
tivity which they achieved through significant investment in new
technology.5 7 The U.S. mills excel in areas where quality, innovation,
marketing, and service are competitive factors.58  But the textile in-
dustry is dependent on the U.S. apparel industry as one of its largest
customers. Largely because of this dependence, the textile industry is
expected to experience a small decline in production and
employment.
59
In the first 18 months since the United States signed the WTO
agreement, employment in the textile industry has declined by 4.6%,
marking the first significant decline in textile employment since
1990.60 As with the apparel industry, it is difficult to isolate the effect
that the ATC had on this decline.
According to the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
(ATMI), the national association for the U.S. textile industry, the neg-
ative effect of the ATC on the textile industry is exacerbated by the
fact that the ATC will result in rapid import increases during the
phase-out, without forcing truly open worldwide markets.6' Accord-
55 Compare U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 43 EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS, Jan. 1996, at 50 with Employment Situation, supra note 2 (apparel employment de-
clined from approximately 960,000 at the end of 1994 to 847,000 in June of 1996).
56 POTENI AL ImpACr, supra note 22, at IV-12, IV-14.
57 Id. at IV-10.
58 Id.
59 Id. at IV-12. The greatest area of direct competition in textiles is in broadwoven cotton
fabrics from India, Pakistan, and China. These nations each have government programs that
keep their raw cotton prices below world market prices. U.S. mills also face higher health,
safety, and labor costs than those in Asia. Id. at 15, 16.
60 See supra note 55 (textile employment declined from approximately 673,000 at year end
1994 to 642,000 in June of 1996).
61 POTENTIAL IMPACr, supra note 22, at IV-7. Ron Sorini, chief textile negotiator for the
Bush administration and negotiator of the majority of the ATC, stated that a major shortcoming
of the ATC is its failure to obtain specific market access requirements. Interview with Ron
Sorini, Senior Vice President, International Development and Government Relations, Fruit of
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ing to the ATMI, the United States would be able to compete in mar-
kets for high quality products if worldwide markets were open.62
The anticipated decline of the U.S. textile and apparel industries
helps to explain why, as discussed in Section I of this Comment, the
United States has been the primary user of the ATC's Transitional
Safeguard provision.63
II. THE TRANSITIONAL SAFEGUARD PROVISION AND
CASES TO DATE
A. The Transitional Safeguard and Dispute Settlement Procedures
1. Transitional Safeguard Definition and Application
Article six of the ATC provides a "transitional safeguard"64
which allows a country to take action to protect its textile and apparel
industries if there is "serious damage" or the "actual threat thereof'
due to increased imports.65 The provision is to be used "as sparingly
the Loom, Inc., in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 12, 1996). Instead the ATC has only a general statement
that countries should improve market access. See ATC, supra note 4, art. 7.
62 PoTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 22, at IV-7. Of the major textile and apparel suppliers that
are GATT members, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Egypt, the Philippines, and Turkey
are frequently cited for maintaining restrictive barriers. Id. at IV-12. Many markets that had
been closed to U.S. exports, including India and Pakistan, are gradually opening as a result of
URA market access agreements. Jennifer Hillman, The GATT, the WTO and the Uruguay
Round Agreements: Trade Activities Involving Textiles and Clothing, 722 PLI/CoMM. 879 (1995).
63 See infra notes 109, 110 and accompanying text.
64 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 1.
65 Id. The safeguard provision in the ATC differs from the GATT 1994 provision in many
respects. The ATC calls for transitional quotas to be applied on a Member-by-Member basis, id.
art. 7, para. 4, whereas GATT 1994 safeguards are generally to be applied to products being
imported irrespective of the source, with deviations permitted under certain conditions. Agree-
ment on Safeguards, April 15, 1994, art. 2, para. 2, art. 5, para. 2, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, TnE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADr NEGOnATONS, 315 (GATT Secretariat ed. 1994)(hereinafter Agree-
ment on Safeguards).
Also, the ATC allows a safeguard to be placed on unfairly traded goods without requiring
compensation to the restricted party, which would be due under normal GATT 1994 rules.
World Trade Org. Meeting in Singapore: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996)(Testimony of Julia K. Hughes, Chair-
man, U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel)(hereinafter WTO Meeting in Sin-
gapore), available in 1996 WL 10830709. Unfairly traded goods are those tainted by dumping,
government subsidies, or sellers' evasion of legitimate regulations regarding the environment,
fair competition, intellectual property protection, etc. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 151. Addition-
ally, the TMB has primary responsibility of supervising transitional safeguard measures, ATC,
supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1, whereas disputes over GATT 1994 safeguards are reviewed in the
first instance according to the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Agreement on Safeguards,
supra, art. 14.
Like the GATT 1994 escape clause, the ATC safeguard provision is very vague. See infra
notes 205 to 222 and accompanying text.
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as possible, ' 66 and it is not to be applied if the "particular product" to
be restrained is already under restraint67 or if it has already been inte-
grated into GAT' 1994 in accordance with the integration procedure
prescribed by the ATC.6 s
"Serious damage" or "actual threat thereof" is to be determined
based on the effect of imports on an industry as reflected by relevant
economic variables such as output, productivity, utilization of capac-
ity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic
prices, profits, and investment.69 For a transitional safeguard to be
invoked, the damage to the industry must be caused by "increased
quantities in total imports of that product. ' 70 Damage due to changes
in technology or consumer preference is not actionable under this pro-
vision.7 ' The Member seeking to apply a safeguard appears to bear
the burden of proof regarding the serious damage determination. 72
Measures invoked under the transitional safeguard are to be ap-
plied on a Member-by-Member basis. "Serious damage" must be at-
tributed to individual Members. Attribution is to be based on a
"sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent" from
the Member and "the level of imports as compared with imports from
other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices at a com-
parable stage of commercial transaction." 73 An "imminent increase"
66 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 1. In the United States, the Committee For the Implemen-
tation of Textile Agreements (CITA), a committee with members from the Departments of La-
bor, Commerce, Treasury, and State, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR), is responsible for making the United States' initial determination of serious damage.
Weiler and Senie, supra note 12, at 512-14.
A serious damage determination by CITA leads to a notification or "call" on the relevant
country, which informs the country that rising imports are damaging the U.S. industry and that
the United States intends to put import restraints in place. WTO Textile Body Recommends That
U.S. Resume Talks on Underwear Imports, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1268 (July 26,
1995) [hereinafter WTO Recommends U.S. Resume].
When a country is called on a particular category, the United States presents a "Statement
of Serious Damage" which describes the economic facts underlying the serious damage determi-
nation. See, e.g., COMMITEE FOR THE IWLEMEN-ATIoN OF TEXTrE AGREEMEmS, STATE-
MENT OF SERIous DAMAGE: CATEGORY 352/652 (COTroN AND MANMADE FIBER UNDERWEAR)
(1995) [hereinafter UNDERWEAR SERIOus DAMAGE], on file in the United States Commerce
Department Trade Reference Room.
67 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 4.
68 Id. art. 6, para. 1.
69 Id. art. 6, para. 3.
70 Id. art. 6, para. 2.
71 Id.
72 The ATC says that a safeguard may be applied when "it is demonstrated" that serious
damage exists and is "demonstrably" caused by imports. Id. art. 6, para. 2.
73 Id. art. 6, para. 4.
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must be measurable and based on more than mere allegation, conjec-
ture, or possibility.74
Preferences are given to certain categories of Members and prod-
ucts in the application of the transitional safeguard. Least developed
nations are to be accorded "significantly more favorable" treatment in
the application of the transitional safeguard provision.75 Similarly,
Members whose total volume of exports is small relative to the total
volume of exports of other Members and who account for only a small
percentage of total imports of that product into a particular importing
Member shall be afforded "deferential and more favorable" treatment
in the application of safeguards.76 Additionally, with respect to wool
products from developing country Members whose (1) economies are
dependent on the wool sector; (2) textile and clothing exports consist
almost exclusively of wool products; and (3) exports to the importing
Member are relatively small for the importing Member, "special con-
sideration" is to be given to the economic needs of such Members
when considering quota levels, growth rates, and flexibility.77 Finally,
"more favorable" treatment is to be accorded to re-imports by a
Member of textile and clothing products which that Member has ex-
ported to another Member for processing and subsequent re-importa-
tion when this type of trade represents a significant portion of the
Member's total textile exports.78 Safeguards are not to be used at all
on exports of "handloom fabrics of the cottage industry.., or tradi-
tional folklore handicraft" products traded in "commercially signifi-
cant quantities prior to 1982,"'79 and products made of pure silk.80
74 Id. art. 6, n.6. For example, the possibility of an imminent increase in imports based on
increased capacity in another country would not be sufficient. Id.
Hereinafter, the required quantum of (1) "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof" to a
domestic industry, (2) causal connection between the damage to the domestic industry and im-
ports, and (3) attribution to the Member against whose products a safeguard is sought, which is
sufficient to support a safeguard shall be referred to collectively as the "Serious Damage"
standard.
75 Id. art. 6, para. 6(a). The ATC does not specify what constitutes "significantly more
favorable" treatment, nor does it define developing or least developed nations.
Many developing nations are significant textile exporters. See Williams, supra note 6; cf.
JAcKsoN, supra note 6.
76 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 6(b).
77 Id. art. 6, para. 6(c).
78 Id. art. 6, para. 6(d).
79 Id. Annex, List of Products Covered by This Agreement, para. 3. "Commercially signifi-
cant" is not defined but examples of such items are listed as "bags, sacks, carpetbacking, cord-
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Members proposing to take a safeguard action shall provide the
relevant facts to the affected Member(s) and the TMB; the safeguard
proponent shall seek a consultation with the affected party.81 If the
consultations produce an agreement on a restraint level, then a quota
can be fixed at not less than the level of imports over the 12 months
ending two months before the notification was issued to the affected
Member.82 If there is no agreement within 60 days of the request for
consultations, the initiating Member may apply a restraint.83 Safe-
guard measures can be maintained for up to three years without ex-
tension, or until the product is integrated into GATr 19 94 .34 If the
restraint is in place for more than one year, it must increase at an
annual rate of at least 6%, unless otherwise justified to the TMB. 5
Importing Members have significant control over the use of safe-
guards in that they can choose when to issue a call and can apply a
restraint if consultations do not produce an agreement. This power is
to be checked, however, by the TMB.
2. TMB Review Procedure and Membership Composition
a. Review Procedure
The TMB is to review all safeguard actions. If Members reach a
bilateral agreement, the TMB is to determine whether the agreement
is justified by the ATC and is to make appropriate recommendations
to the Members concerned.86 If an agreement is not reached and a
safeguard is unilaterally imposed, the TMB is to "promptly conduct an
examination of the matter" and "make appropriate recommendations
to the Members concerned within 30 days."8 7 It is of note that the
burden of proof in a transitional safeguard matter appears to be on
81 ld. art. 6, para. 7.
82 ld art. 6, para. 8.
83 Id art. 6, para 10. The restraint level is to be no less than the level of imports over the 12
months ending 2 months before the notification was issued. Id. art. 6, para. 8.
In "highly unusual or critical circumstances" a safeguard may be applied before consulta-
tions with the affected country, subject to prompt consultation with the affected country and
review by the TMB. Id. art. 6, para. 11.
84 Id. art. 6, para. 12.
85 Id art. 6, para. 13.
86 Id art. 6, para. 9. However, the TMB has yet to recommend that any bilateral agreements
be overturned. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
87 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 10. Also, either member can refer the matter to the TMB
prior to the expiration of the sixty day consultation period or the imposition of a safeguard. Ld.
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the Member seeking to invoke a safeguard,88 and the TMB's standard
of review appears to be de novo.8 9
After reviewing a matter, which review must include an invitation
to the Members concerned to participate, the TMB issues observa-
tions or recommendations' which Members are to "endeavor to ac-
cept in full."91 If a Member does not accept the recommendations,
the Member is to provide the TMB with its reasons within one month
of receiving the recommendations. Following consideration of the
reasons given, the TMB is to issue further recommendations. If the
matter remains unresolved, either party may refer the matter to the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and invoke Article XXIII of GATT
1994 and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
92
b. Membership
The TMB consists of ten members "appointed by Members desig-
nated by the [WTO's] Council For Trade In Goods" and a Chair-
man.93 Membership on the TMB is to be "balanced and broadly
representative of the [WTO] Members" and is to rotate "at appropri-
ate intervals. '94 Each member of the TMB serves in an "ad personam
basis."95 The TMB is to "develop its own working procedures," 96 and
88 See supra note 72. Because the TMB is to "conduct an examination," ATC, supra note 4,
art. 6, paras. 10, 11, the party seeking to apply the safeguard may not formally have the burden
of proof before the TMB. However, as a functional matter, the party seeking to apply the safe-
guard will likely have to produce "factual data," Id. art. 6, paras. 9, 10, sufficient to support its
case.
89 Id., art. 6, para. 10. The TMIB is to conduct an "investigation of the matter, including the
determination of serious damage." Id. The language suggests that the TMB shall make its own
determinations without regard for the parties' factual findings or conclusions regarding serious
damage.
90 Id. art. 8, para. 5-7.
91 Id. art. 8, para. 9.
92 Id. art. 8, para. 10. Article XXIII of GATT 1994 and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provide for a dispute settlement by a three
member ad hoe panel with the possibility of appeal to a standing seven person appellate body. If
a Member fails to abide by the DSB's recommendations, the DSB can authorize Members to
suspend the application of concessions or other obligations to the reluctant Member. The Mem-
ber may then withdraw from GATr. See GATr 1994, supra note 5, art. XXIII; Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (hereinaf-
ter Dispute Settlement Understanding). See also Porges, supra note 5, at 4-5.
93 ATC, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1.
94 Id.
95 Id. Thus, TMB members are to serve in an individual, theoretically politically neutral
capacity rather than as a representative of their governments.
96 Id. art. 8, para. 2.
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reach decisions by consensus. 7 A TMB consensus does not require
the consent of a representative appointed by a country that is a party
to a controversy before the TMB. 9s
The composition of the TMB was arguably the most prominent
early problem faced by the WTO. 99 The ATC's statement that the
TMB members should be "balanced and broadly representative" ob-
viously lacks specificity. Importing countries, primarily led by the Eu-
ropean Union,1"° argued that the ten TMB seats should be evenly split
between members selected by importing and exporting countries, as
had been the case with the Textile Surveillance Body'01 which admin-
istered the MFA.102 Exporting countries asked for a majority (six) of
seats'0 3 based on the relatively large number of exporting countries. 1°4
Importing countries argued that the TMB composition should reflect
the size of import markets, not the number of countries involved.10 5
Developing countries threatened to hold up all WTO committee
chairperson appointments - which would have prevented the WTO
from operating effectively - until the dispute was settled.' 6
The dispute has been resolved by an agreement which, for the
first three years, gives exporting nations five seats, importing nations
four seats, and creates one "swing" seat to be held by the two groups
alternately.10 7 Additionally, the outgoing chairman of GAIT, Andras
97 See id. The ATC does not specifically state how decisions should be reached. See id.
However, it states that "consensus within the TMB does not require the assent or concurrence of
members appointed by Members involved in an unresolved issue under review by the TMB." Id.
at art. 8, para. 2. The traditional GATT method of decision making has been predominately by
consensus. See IMPLEmENTiNo BmL, supra note 5, at 662. The TMB reportedly makes decisions
by consensus. See WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66.
98 ATC, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 2.
99 Sheel Kohl, Starting Date for Trade Body Agreed, SoUTH CHNA MoRNING PosT, Dec. 9,
1994, Business Section, at 14; see Frances Williams, Textiles Compromise Puts WTO Back on
Course, FIN. TimEs, Feb. 1, 1995, World Trade News Section, at 4.
100 See Williams, supra note 99.
101 GATT Textile Board Chairman Calls for More Cooperation With WTO Monitoring, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1898 (Dec. 7, 1994).
102 Irene Ngoo, Last-minute Accord Reached in Textile Row, Tim STRAIS TmaEs (Singapore),
Feb. 2, 1995, at 4.
103 Id.
104 John Zarocostas, Nations Fail to Agree on Makeup of TMB, DAILY NEWS REcoRD, Dec.
22, 1994, at 12.
105 Id.
106 Williams, supra note 99.
107 WTO Nominates, supra note 14. The exporting nations which will name a TMB member
consist of:
1. One member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (with one member rotating
with the five other nations);
2. Hong Kong and South Korea to alternate with each other,
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Szepesi of Hungary, is to serve as the Chairman of the TMB.108 The
controversy that surrounded TMB membership indicates that the
WTO Members recognize both the importance of the body and the
potential for politically based decision-making by its members.
B. TMB Transitional Safeguard Cases to Date
The United States has been the only country to invoke the ATC
safeguard clause.1' 9 The United States issued 25 calls on WTO Mem-
bers during the first 20 months of the ATC." 0 Several unresolved
cases were referred to the TMB for review; many others were with-
3. Pakistan and China to alternate with each other (if China does not become a WTO mem-
ber, it will be replaced with another country);
4. India to alternate with one member of a group consisting of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia;
and,
5. Latin American and Caribbean nations to decide among themselves how they will rotate
a seat among themselves (this could eventually be expanded to include a second delegate).
Importing nations which will nominate a TMB representative include:
1. the United States;
2. the European Union;
3. Canada; and
4. Japan.
The "swing seat" is to be occupied by Norway, Turkey, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Po-
land, Romania, or Slovakia. Norway will represent these countries in the first year, Turkey in
the second year. After two years the countries will decide among themselves which country
chooses the delegate to represent them. Id.
Notably, during the first year of TMB meetings, China, a non-WTO member but a major
textile exporter and a potential WTO Member in the future, was allowed to attend TMB meet-
ings. WTO Nominates, supra note 14.
108 The selection of Mr. Szepesi was part of the compromise reached to resolve the TMB
composition issue. Williams, supra note 99.
109 See Hecker Statement, supra note 44 ("the United States is the only WTO member coun-
try thus far to impose a new quota under the agreement's safeguard procedures"). Trkey has
also imposed textile and apparel import restrictions, but this appears to have been based on an
interpretation of European Union rules and not a serious damage determination. See U.S. Says
No to India's Request for WTO Panel in Dispute Over Indian Woolens, DAILY NEWS Rnc (Mar.
28, 1996), at 5 [hereinafter U.S. Says No].
110 A word search (using the search terms "serious damage" & "CITA") of Westlaw and
LEXIS Federal Register databases on November 6, 1996, indicated that for the period from
January 1, 1995, to August 31, 1996, the United States issued 30 calls on textile and apparel
items. Of these, 21 were issued against products from countries which were WTO members
when the call was initiated. Another 4 (two calls on El Salvadoran products and one each on
products from Columbia and Guatemala) were directed at items from countries which became
WTO members before August 31,1996. One country called (Bulgaria) became a WTO Member
after August 31, 1996. The final four calls were issued against products from non-WTO Mem-
bers and were authorized under Section 204 of the Agriculture Act of 1956, as amended.
Thus, 25 U.S. textile and apparel calls affected WTO Members during the first 20 months of
the ATC.
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drawn or settled.' While the TMB is to review settlement agree-
ments of WTO Members, the TMB has not disturbed any bilateral
settlements.112
In six of the cases decided by the TMB, the TMB attempted to
resolve the conflict by application of the "serious damage" standard.
The results were mixed. The TMB decided in favor of the exporting
country in two cases, in favor of the United States in one case, and
reached no decision in three cases." 3
The following subsections summarize the cases that the TMB has
attempted to decide based on application of the "serious damage"
standard. Each subsection encompasses: (1) a listing of the countries
initially called by the United States and a statement of which coun-
tries' cases settled before reaching a TMB hearing, (2) the basis of the
United States' determination of damage to the U.S. industry from im-
ported goods, (3) the basis of attribution of damage to total imports
and imports from the countries whose cases went before the TMB, and
(4) the TMB's decision and the status of the dispute as of August 31,
1996.11
111 See World Trade Organization: Hearing Before the House Ways and Means Comm.[sic],
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Terence P. Stewart, Managing Partner, Stewart and
Stewart)(hereinafter Stewart Statement), available in 1996 WL 7137141. Stewart stated that 10
cases had been referred to the TMB. Id. Another source stated that the TMB reviewed 9 cases
during this period. Hecker Statement, supra note 44. The author has found no indication of a
TMB review of a U.S. call since the period covered by these statements.
112 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
113 The author has found six cases that the TMB attempted to decide by reference to the
Serious Damage standard. These cases are shown in Table II, infra Section III. Note that in a
seventh case the TMB ruled in favor of Hong Kong, but the TMB made its decision based on its
determination that the product in question was already under restraint. WTO Rules for Hong
Kong in Wool Dispute With the U.S., REUTERs, Sept. 29,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUFIN File. Because this case with Hong Kong was not decided based on a determination of
serious damage or its causes, it is not considered to have involved the Serious Damage standard
for the purposes of this Comment.
114 The economic facts of the following cases are derived from the respective "Statement of
Serious Damage" issued by the United States for each case. These economic figures are summa-
rized in Table II, which follows Section III, infra. The actual facts as presented by the United
States to the TMB during the TMB's formal review may have differed from those found in the
"Statement of Serious Damage" due to the lapse in time between the calls and the TMB hear-
ings. The USTR refuses to make available the information contained in the U.S. presentation(s)
to the TMB. See infra notes 266 to 268 and accompanying text.
Despite the potential discrepancies between the information presented herein and that on
which the TMB based its decisions, the information found in each "Statement of Serious Dam-
age" should provide a reasonable picture of the United States' case, given that the time elapsed
between the calls and the TMB hearings was limited. Economic conditions could have changed
in this time period; but given the USTR and TMB's refusal to provide information, what is
presented is all that is publicly available.
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1. Underwear
The United States called five WTO countries on underwear ex-
ports: the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras, Thailand, and
Turkey.115 Bilateral agreements were reached with the Dominican
Republic 1 6 and Turkey.117 The safeguard action against Thailand was
withdrawn."' The TMB formally reviewed the unilateral quotas im-
posed against Costa Rica and Honduras. 19
According to the United States, "serious damage" to the U.S. do-
mestic underwear industry was evidenced by a decline in production
of 3.8% in 1993 and 3.5% in the first nine months of 1994.120 Domes-
tic producers' share of the domestic market declined from 73% in
1992 to 65% in 1994.121 In that same two-year period, domestic em-
ployment declined by 2,321 jobs, or approximately 5% of category
jobs. 1'
The effect of underwear imports on the domestic industry was
evidenced by a 48.7% increase in total underwear imports into the
United States between calendar year 1992 and 1994.'1 Imported
goods as a percentage of total domestic production were 54% in the
year ended September 1994, up from 37% in 1992.124
The TMB decisions as reported herein are based on newspaper reports and have been ver-
bally verified by U.S. trade officials. The TMB does not release its decisions to the public. The
USTR refused to release the TMB decisions, but a representative stated that the decisions in-
cluded no explanation of the TMB's reasoning, and read an opinion to the author. The author
read one TMB decision in the office of a trade official which confirmed that they provide no
insight into the TMB's reasoning. See infra notes 266 to 268 and accompanying text.
115 UNDERWEAR SERious DAMAGE, supra note 66 (the countries called and all of the eco-
nomic facts that follow regarding this category are from this source).
116 CITA Announces New Limits on Underwear And Nightwear, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1103 (June 28, 1995).
117 Unilateral quotas were initially imposed on goods from Tirkey and Thailand. The TMB
was to review these actions, but just before the scheduled hearing the United States and Thrkey
reached an agreement and the United States rescinded the quota on goods from Thailand. Jim
Ostroff and John Zarocostas, Importers, U.S. Makers Accept TMB Quota Underwear Ruling.
(World Trade Organization's Textile Monitoring Body Rules That US Quota On Caribbean Im-
ports Is Without Basis), DAILY NEWS REc., July 25, 1995, at 4.
118 Id.
119 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66, at 1268. These are considered to be two
cases for purposes of discussing the number of TMB decisions. Because the cases involved the
same Statement of Serious Damage and the TMB decided them at the same time, hereinafter the
two cases are collectively referred to as "Underwear."
120 See UNDERWEAR Siuous DAMAGE, supra note 66, at 10.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 11.
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id. at 10.
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Costa Rica accounted for 15% of total underwear exports to the
United States in 1994 and experienced a 61% increase in exports to
the United States between 1992 and 1994.125 Costa Rican underwear
entered the United States at a landed duty-paid value 69% below the
average price of U.S. producers in 1994.126 Honduras represented
6.7% of U.S. imports in 1994, and saw a 182% increase in exports
between 1992 and 1994.127 In 1994, Honduran underwear entered the
United States at a value equal to 62% of the average U.S. producer's
price.128
The TMB found that Costa Rican and Honduran underwear was
not causing serious damage to the U.S. industry; however, the TMB
could not reach a consensus on whether the imports constituted a
threat of serious damage. 129 Consequently, the TMB recommended
that the countries and the United States resume consultations regard-
ing the issue.130 As the TMB did not recommend rescission of the
safeguard, the quota remained in place during additional consulta-
125 Id. at 7.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. It is of note that the United States was willing to give the countries called practically
unlimited Guaranteed Access Level (GAL) quotas under the 807(a) program. Under 807(a),
fabric that is made and cut in the United States is then assembled (sewn) offshore. Only the
value added in assembly off shore is subject to tariffs when the finished product is reimported to
the United States. Prior to the calls, much of the underwear imported from the Caribbean na-
tions was being produced under the 807 program, which applies to fabric that is cut (but not
necessarily made) in the United States and then assembled offshore. Tariffs under 807 also apply
only to the value added portion of the good when reimported. The American Apparel Manufac-
turers Association expressed disapproval for the call because nearly all of the underwear im-
ported from the Caribbean was made by their members, primarily from U.S. made fabric.
However, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute supported the call because the 807(a)
program would require that the imported underwear contain U.S. made fabric. Jim Ostroff,
Makers Hit U.S. Plan for CBI Underwear Quota, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Apr. 10, 1995, at 12.
The United States' goal may be sanctioned by the ATC, which states that "more favorable
treatment shall be accorded to reimports by a Member of textile and clothing products which
that Member has exported to another Member for processing and subsequent reimportation...
when these products are imported from a Member for which this type of trade represents a
significant proportion of its total exports of textiles and clothing." ATC, supra note 4, art. 6,
para. 6(d).
129 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66.
Within five months of the TMB's inability to reach a decision on the threat of serious dam-
age in this case, Fruit of the Loom, one of the United States' largest makers of underwear an-
nounced that it would close 13 U.S. plants, eliminate 5,000 jobs, and would experience a
significant net loss for the year. Tnm CHICAGO SuN TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1995, Financial Section, at
56. (Other factors in addition to increased imports also contributed to the net loss). Fruit of the
Loom has shifted production capacity offshore in order to compete with lower priced imports.
See Charles Peters, Truth was Stranger Than Fiction in America in 1995 - As Usual, CHAREs.
TON GAzE= AND DAILY MAIL, Sunday Edition, Dec. 24, 1995, at C2.
130 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66.
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tions.131 The dispute with Honduras was eventually settled in an
agreement that also involved nightwear and women's and girls' wool
coats. 32
Despite consultations advised by the TMB, the United States and
Costa Rica failed to reach an agreement. Upon examination of re-
ports from the two countries, the TMB affirmed its earlier findings. 3 3
Costa Rica requested additional consultations under Article XXIII of
GATT 1994 and Article 4 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).3 No agreement was reached, and on Feb. 22, 1996,
Costa Rica requested panel review under the DSU.' 35 In November
of 1996, as this Comment was going to press, the DSB panel found
that the United States had not demonstrated serious damage, appar-
ently based largely on the fact that the United States had reached




The United States called four countries - Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, and Jamaica - on "Cotton and Manmade Fiber Paja-
mas & Other Nightwear" imports. 137 Bilateral agreements were
reached with Jamaica and El Salvador.13  Unilateral limits were im-
131 Williams, supra note 6.
132 U.S., Honduras Settle Underwear Quota Issue, DAILY NEws RECORD, Sept. 19, 1995, at 8.
The settlement contained a quota that allowed for significant growth in underwear imports and
gave a practically unlimited GAL quota for items assembled in Honduras from U.S.-made and
U.S.-cut fabric under the 807(a) program. Id. (See Ostroff, supra note 128, for an explanation of
807(a)).
133 Notices, WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Concerning U.S. Restrictions on Cotton




136 Helene Cooper, WTO Says U.S. Quotas on Underwear Imported From Costa Rica are
Unfair, WALL SR. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B8. al, Id. The United States has not yet indicated
whether it will remove the quotas, appeal the decision, or not abide by the decision. See id.
137 COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXTnIL AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF SERI-
OUS DAMAGE: CATEGORY 351/651 UPDATED TO INCLUDE COSTA RICA (COTrON AND MAN-
MADE FIBER PAJAMAs AND OTHER Nirm-wEAR), (June 1995) (the countries called and all of
the economic facts that follow regarding this category are from this source) [hereinafter
NIGHTWEAR SERIOUS DAMAGE], on file in the U.S. Commerce Department Trade Reference
Room. The figures provided herein are from the June Statement of Serious Damage rather than
an earlier Statement from March 1995 because the June Statement was closer in time to the
TMB decision and therefore should better reflect the data before the TMB.
138 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66, at 1269; see also CITA Announces New
Limits on Underwear and Nightwear, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1103 (June 28, 1995) (the
agreement with Jamaica provides a GAL quota for imports from Jamaica of nightwear assem-
bled from U.S.-made and U.S.-cut fabric but limits the amount otherwise imported).
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posed on Costa Rica but were later rescinded.139 Unilateral limits
were imposed on Honduras, and the TMB conducted a formal review
of the Honduran quota.14
The U.S. alleged "serious damage" based on a 14.1% decrease in
domestic manufacturers market share and a corresponding 10.7% de-
crease in U.S. production between 1992 and 1994.141 During this time
period, the United States experienced a loss of 807 jobs in the
nightwear industry, or 5.4% of industry jobs. 142 However, U.S. indus-
try production declined by less than one half of one percent and total
wages actually increased in 1994.143
The link between domestic industry damage and imported prod-
ucts was reflected by a 22% increase in total category imports be-
tween 1992 and 1994.141 Imported products as a percentage of
domestic production rose from 80% in 1992 to 110% in the first nine
months of 1994.145 Honduran exports increased by 71% in 1994 and
rocketed up 722% between 1992 and 1994.146 Honduran imports en-
tered the United States at a landed duty paid price 53% less than the
average price of domestic goods in 1994.147 Nevertheless, Honduras
accounted for only 1.5% of U.S. nightwear imports in the 12 months
ended March 1995.148
The TMB found that nightwear imports from Honduras were not
causing serious damage to the U.S. industry and that there was not a
threat of such damage. The TMB accordingly recommended that the
Unites States rescind the unilateral quotas that it had imposed. 149 The
United States initially did not comply with the TMB recommenda-
139 The United States rescinded its safeguard on Costa Rican nightwear after the TMB ruled
against the United States in the Honduran nightwear case. Both of these U.S. calls were based
on the same "Statement of Serious Damage." Jim Ostroff, U.S. Withdraws Curbs on Costa Rican
Cotton, Man-made Nightwear, Pajamas, DAILY NEws REc., Nov. 3, 1995, at 8.
140 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66. This case is hereinafter referred to as
"Nightwear."
141 NiGHTWEAR Sinuous DAMAGE, supra note 137, at 1Q (Table II).
142 Id. at 11.
143 Id. at 10, 11.
144 Id. at 9 (Table I).
145 Id. at 8 (Table II). Approximately 7% growth in the size of the domestic market cush-
ioned the effect of increased imports on the domestic manufacturing industry's production and
market share. See id.
146 1d& at 6.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 WTO Recommends U.S. Resume, supra note 66.
The U.S. Chief Textile Negotiator, Rita Hayes, noted that a call may be justified when is-
sued, despite a subsequent TMB decision against the United States or a "no decision." Hayes
pointed out that in the time between the call and the TMB hearing import levels might have
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tion.150 However, the United States ultimately rescinded the safe-
guard on Honduran nightwear in an agreement reached that also
covered outstanding disputes over underwear and women's and girls'
wool coats.151
3. Men's Coats
The United States called two countries - Brazil and India - on
this category.152 The call against Brazil was dropped prior to a TMB
hearing. 53 After consultations failed, the United States imposed a
unilateral safeguard on India's products in this category, and the TMB
reviewed the U.S. action and the serious damage determination. 54
Alleged serious damage to the U.S. industry was demonstrated by
a 4.2% decline in production and a 14.3% decline in market share in
this category during the nine month period ending September 1994.155
Between 1993 and 1994,275 jobs - 4.8% of total category jobs - were
lost. However, the decline in U.S. production was only 1.9% for the
twelve month period ending September 1994.
The connection between domestic industry damage and imports
was indicated by an increase in total category imports of 40.2% in the
year ending January 1995. Imported items as a percentage of domes-
tic production increased from 85% in 1992 to 111% during the nine
month period ending September 1994.156 Imports from India rose by
105% and accounted for 24% of total U.S. imports in the year ending
January 1995. In both 1993 and 1994, India was the leading exporter
been affected by unilateral quotas or the U.S. domestic industry might have increased produc-
tion. Ostroff, supra note 28.
150 Jim Ostroff, Caribbean Underwear Row Goes Back to WTO's Court. (World Trade Organ-
ization on U.S. Underwear Trade With Costa Rica and Honduras), WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Aug.
22, 1995, at 20.
151 See U.S., Honduras Settle Underwear Quota Issue, supra note 132.
152 CoM1 tmE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXTILE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF SERI-
OUS DAMAGE: CATEGORY 434 (MN's AND Boy's WOOL COATS OTimR THAN Surr TYPE)
(1995) (the countries called and all of the economic facts that follow regarding this category are
from this source) [hereinafter MEN'S COATS SEous DAMAGE].
153 WTO's Textile Monitoring Body to Review Curbs on Woolen Garments, 12 INT'L TRADE
REP. 1382 (Aug. 16, 1995).
154 U.S. Gets Mixed Rulings By WTO Group on Restraints on Indian Wool Imports, 12 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1571 (Sept. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Mixed Rulings]. The case is hereinafter
referred to as "Men's Coats."
155 The large decline in domestic manufacturers' market share relative to the moderate de-
cline in production is explained by the fact that the total domestic market increased during this
time period. See MEN'S COATS SEmous DAMAGE, supra note 152, at 7.
156 The dramatic growth in imports compared to the modest decline in U.S. domestic produc-
tion is explained by the fact that the U.S. domestic market grew by 11.1% during the twelve
month period ending September 1994. See id.
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of coats to the United States. In 1994, Indian coats in this category
entered the United States at a landed, duty-paid price 70% below the
U.S. domestic producers' average price.
The TMB found no serious damage or threat thereof and recom-
mended that the United States rescind its safeguard. 5 7 The United
States has rescinded the quota. 58
4. Women's Coats
The United States called two countries in this category - India
and Honduras.' 59 A unilateral safeguard was imposed against Hondu-
ras before a bilateral accord was reached as part of an agreement that
included underwear and nightwear. 60  However, the United States
was unable to reach an agreement with India and imposed a unilateral
quota against the Indian products. The TMB reviewed the action.'
61
"Serious damage" to the U.S. industry was alleged based on a
decline in domestic production of 1.0% during the nine month period
ending September 1994 and 1.8% during the twelve month period
ending September 1994. U.S. producers' market share declined by
6.8% in the first nine months of 1994 -and was down by 4.4% for the
twelve month period ending September 1994. Between 1993 and
1994, the United States reported a loss of 363 jobs, which represented
16.2% of the category jobs.' 62
The relationship between damage and imports was reflected by
the fact that imports rose by 9% during the year ending January 1995
and captured 59% of the U.S. market. In this period, Indian exports
surged by 402% to capture 3.1% of the United States market. In
1994, imports from India entered the United States at a price 79%
below the U.S. producers' average price.
157 Mixed Rulings, supra note 154.
158 Notices, Cancellation of a Limit on Certain Wool Textile Products Produced or Manufac-
tured in India, 60 Fed. Reg. 56,985 (Comm. for the Implementation of Textile Agreements 1996);
Paula L. Green, U.S. Drops Warning on Woolens Exported by India; Hong Kong, J. CoM., Nov.
21, 1995, at A5; U.S. Says No, supra note 109.
159 COMMrTrEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXILE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF SERI-
Ous DAMAGE: CATEGORY 435 (WOMEN'S AND GIuR's WOOL COATS) (April 1995) (the coun-
tries called and all of the economic facts that follow regarding this category are from this source)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S COATS SERious DAMAGE].
160 See U.S., Honduras Settle Underwear Quota Issue, supra note 132.
161 Mixed Rulings, supra note 154. The case is hereinafter referred to as "Women's Coats."
162 The severe disparity between the mild production decline and the severe employment
decline is difficult to reconcile. Perhaps the USTR's figures are wrong. Another potential expla-
nation would be a significant increase in automation in a short time period.
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Although the TMB found that there was no serious damage, it
could not reach a consensus on whether there was a threat of serious
damage.163 Since the TMB did not recommend rescission of the safe-
guard, it remained in place.164 India requested that a WTO trade dis-
pute panel be set up to hear this matter, as well as a dispute regarding
woven wool shirts and blouses.165 In March of 1996, the United States
turned down India's request for dispute panels. 66 However, pursuant
to the terms of the WTO's dispute settlement procedures, at the
DSB's next meeting, which was held in April 1996, the DSB agreed to
set up dispute panels. 67 Subsequently, the United States withdrew
the safeguard on women's and girl's wool coats, 68 leaving only the
dispute over woven wool shirts and blouses (summarized below), a
matter in which the TMB unanimously agreed there was a threat of
serious damage, to be heard by a dispute panel.
169
5. Woven Blouses
The United States called two countries - India and Hong Kong -
on imports of this category. 70 No bilateral agreements were reached
and the TMB heard cases from both countries. The Hong Kong case
was resolved in favor of Hong Kong; the TMB determined that, since
the Hong Kong products were subject to a group limit, the United
states could not apply a specific limit to the category.171 The United
163 Mixed Rulings, supra note 154.
164 See generally Williams, supra note 6.
165 Indian Complaint Against U.S. to be Taken to WTO Dispute Body, INT'L TxADE DAILY
(BNA), (Jan. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Indian Complaint]. The woven wool shirts and blouses case
is discussed in section 5, infra.
166 U.S. Says No, supra note 109.
167 Id.; Robert Evans, WTO Sets Panels in India-U.S. Textile Disputes, REUTERS EUR. Bus.
REp., April 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter WTO Sets
Panels].
168 Notice, Cancellation of a Limit on Certain Wool Textile Products Produced or Manufac-
tured in India, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,722 (Comm. For the Implementation of Textile Agreements
1996).
169 See Notice, WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Concerning U.S. Restrictions on Wo-
ven Wool Shirts and Blouses From India, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,516 (Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep. 1996).
[hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings].
170 COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEXTILE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF SERI-
OUS DAMAGE: CATEGORY 440 (WOvEN WOOL SHIRTS AND BLOUSES) (April 1995)(the coun-
tries called and all of the economic facts that follow regarding this category are from this source)
[hereinafter WOVEN BLOUSES SERIOUS DAMAGE]
171 Sheel Kohl, Territory Wins Textile Battle in WTO Ruling, SOUTH CHNA MORNING POST,
Sept. 29, 1995, at 14.
The ATC states that a "safeguard measure shall not be applied to the exports of any Mem-
ber whose exports of the particular product are already under restraint under this agreement."
ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 4. The item in question from Hong Kong was under export
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States applied a quota on the Indian goods, and the TMB reviewed
the case.1 72
"Serious damage" to the U.S. manufacturing industry was evi-
denced by a decline of 7.58% during the nine month period ending
September 1994 and 12.5% for the 12 month period ending Septem-
ber 1994. During these periods, U.S. manufacturers' market share de-
clined by 34.4% and 36.1% respectively. In 1994, a total of 2,125 jobs
were lost, representing 6.2% of all category jobs.
The causal connection between damage and imports was indi-
cated by a 94% increase in total imported items in the year ending
January 1995. Imports held 60.1% of the domestic market in the nine
month period ending September 1994. Imports from India expanded
by 414% to account for 54% of total imports during the year ending
January 1995. In 1994, Indian garments entered the United States at a
price 53% below the average U.S. manufacturers' price.
The TMB determined that a threat of serious damage existed.' 73
India asked the T1MB to reconsider its decision, and in December of
1995 the TMB affirmed its earlier findings. 74 India sought the estab-
lishment of a dispute settlement panel; however, it was blocked by
the United States in March 1996. Nonetheless, the DSB, at its meet-
ing the following month, automatically agreed to establish the
panel.175 The panel was still being established in May 1996.176 The
panel is expected to issue a report with its findings and recommenda-
tions within six to nine months of the panel's establishment. 177
The facts of each case as reported in the "Statement of Serious
Damage" reports and outcomes as reported in public media, are
shown in the following table:
controls applied to a basket of 60 items. Kohl, supra. This decision does not involve the defini-
tion of the Serious Damage standard and so is not discussed further in this Comment.
172 Mixed Rulings, supra note 154. The case is hereinafter referred to as "Woven Blouses."
173 Id. This source notes that the TMB did not make a decision on "future action." The
meaning of this is unclear. Perhaps the TMB reserves the right to say that a safeguard is inap-
propriate even if there is a threat of serious damage. However, the ATC states that a Member
may take a safeguard action if there is a threat of serious damage. ATC, supra note 4, art. 6,
para. 2.
174 Indian Protest of U.S. Safeguards Rejected by Textile Monitoring Body, Ir'rL TRADE
DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 28, 1995), available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD database [hereinafter In-
dian Protest]; WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, supra note 169.
175 U.S. Says No, supra note 109; WTO Sets Panels, supra note 167.
176 WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, supra note 169, at 24,517.
177 Id. In addition to arguing that the safeguard is not warranted, India has requested that the
panel determine that the United States should have been forced to choose at the outset whether
it would claim the existence of serious damage or rather claim a threat of serious damage.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CASES
A. Significance of the Early Decisions
The early decisions of the TMB are critical to its success. 178 The
ATC does not define the "serious damage" standard. Therefore, it
falls to the TMB's decisions to give shape to the standard through
common law accretion. The TMB's early decisions are extremely im-
portant to this process. They begin developing the "serious damage"
standard and establishing the credibility and effectiveness, or lack
thereof, of the TMB.
Even though the TMB does not publish reasoned opinions, the
facts179 and the holdings of each case develop a TMB common law.
While the language of the ATC makes it difficult to precisely define
the standard,180 the TMB decisions should begin to create a range for
what constitutes serious damage or the actual threat thereof.18' The
location of the serious damage "zone" will not only resolve individual
cases before the TMB, but perhaps more importantly will affect ongo-
ing safeguard negotiations,182 future safeguard negotiations, and fu-
ture use of calls.' 83 The TMB's definition of the standard will
178 See Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L E. CON. L. 555, 599 (1996).
179 The TMB does not make formal fact findings, see supra note 115, which, as discussed infra
in section IV. B., limits the current process' ability to define the "serious damage" standard.
Nevertheless, the individual TMB members' perceptions of the facts combined with the holdings
in each case create hazy precedents.
180 Regarding the use of the stated factors to determine serious damage, the ATC states that
none of these factors "either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give decisive
guidance." ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 3.
181 Vhile the ATC does not discuss stare decisis, it is generally accepted in international law
that past decisions are used as precedents. Cf JACKSON, supra note 6, at 89. For example, when
the TMB determined that the United States could not impose a transitional safeguard quota on
Hong Kong goods which were already subject to a group limit, a "senior trade official from a
major developing nation, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the TMB ruling 'had set
a precedent for the future' by which it would be impossible to bring before the TMB cases that
are already under restraint under a group limit." TMB Rules Against U.S. Calls on Hong Kong
Shirts, Blouses, DAILY NEws REc., Sept. 29, 1995, at 3.
182 For example, the United States settled the safeguard dispute with Costa Rica over
nightwear under pressure of a TMB review. Jim Ostroff, supra note 139. The United States had
lost the Nightwear case with Honduras based on the same statement of serious damage. The
United States was also reportedly concerned that a TMB decision against the United States
might jeopardize existing bilateral agreements with Jamaica and El Salvador on nightwear. Id.
183 Following its disappointing showings before the TMB, the United States practically quit
invoking safeguards. Williams, supra note 6. The only U.S. call on WTO Members that the
author has found since the TMB decisions in September 1995 was issued against El Salvador in
April 1996. See Notices, Request for Public Comments on Bilateral Textile Consultations with
the Government of El Salvador on Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products Produced or
Manufactured in El Salvador, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,762 (Comm. for the Implementation of Textile
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significantly affect the power of importing countries to use a quota call
to facilitate bilateral agreements on quotas or the unilateral imposi-
tion of quotas. The bargaining power that parties to quota negotia-
tions have will largely be determined by the likelihood that the TMB
would support each party's position.1' 4
The early decisions of the TMB indicate the TMB's degree of
political neutrality and credibility. As one trade official noted before
the TMB's Underwear hearings, "The impartiality of the TMB is a
must, if we are to keep the phaseout of the MultiFiber Arrangement
from turning into a north-south confrontation."' 85
If the TMB does not prove to be an effective, impartial dispute
resolution mechanism, then the exporting countries could find their
textile industries at the mercy of CITA, which one U.S. importer asso-
ciation employee called "a rogue agency that is not in sync with the
stated U.S. foreign and economic policies.' 1 86 Exporters would be left
to suffer the consequences of potentially excessive U.S. protection or
to the risks of attempting to circumvent U.S. quotas by re-routing and
transshipping goods'8 7 in contravention of the ATC.an Conversely, a
Agreements 1996). The United States and El Salvador reached an agreement without going
before the TMB. Notices, Announcing Settlement on Import Limits and Guaranteed Access
Levels and Adjusting an Import Limit for Certain Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products
Produced or Manufactured in El Salvador, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,396 (Comm. for the Implementation
of Textile Agreements 1996).
184 See, e.g., Ostroff, supra note 28 (an unnamed import industry official remarked, "When it
became clear the TMB would actually review the justification for the calls, CITA was forced to
negotiate incredibly large underwear quotas with the Caribbean countries and Turkey, and with-
draw the Thailand call, rather than risk a massive defeat in Geneva").
185 John Zarocostas, Global Board Hears Case on Underwear Quotas, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, July 14, 1995, at 11.
186 Jim Ostroff, U.S. Targets Wool Coats Imports From Russia, WoamN's WEAR DAILY, Sept.
27, 1995. Comment of Laura Jones, executive director, U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles
and Apparel. Jones' comment was in response to a call on Russian products which are not
subject to the ATC because Russia is not a WTO member, and the comment that CITA is out of
sync with U.S. policy was specifically referring to U.S. policy toward former communist coun-
tries. Nevertheless, Jones' comment reflects the view that CITA zealously defends the domestic
textile and apparel industries and can act with wide discretion, which could significantly impair
exporters generally.
187 For example, China, while not a WTO member, is estimated to illegally export $2 billion
annually to the United States. PoTENTIAL IMPACt, supra note 22, at 11 n.10; see also Jim Ostroff,
Hong Kong Seeks to Bar Customs Jump Teams, WoMEN's WEAR DAILY, July 31, 1996, at 10. It
would be naive to think that this option would not be considered by WTO members. Some level
of U.S. exclusion of a country's goods would make it worth the risk for the country to attempt to
bypass ATC rules.
188 ATC, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 1. This paragraph says that Member nations should estab-
lish the necessary legal provisions and procedures to ensure that circumvention by transship-
ment, re-routing, false deciaration concerning country or place of origin, and falsification of
official documents does not occur.
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biased TMB could also produce inadequate transitional protection for
U.S. industries and cause excessive disruption in the lives of U.S. em-
ployees and investors.18 9 The United States might resort to refusing
to implement TMB recommendations, as it threatened to do following
Nightwear.19° The United States could also find other ways to penal-
ize a nation for exporting excessively, such as instituting quota calls on
other categories in order to harass the country or using non-quota im-
port barriers such as quality standards as a pretext for limiting im-
ports, both of which would contravene ATC rules but might be
difficult to combat.19'
In the event they are dissatisfied, both importing and exporting
countries can appeal TMB decisions to the DSB. 92 Without a credi-
ble and effective TMB, Member nations could frequently find them-
selves appealing TMB decisions to the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body, 93 which would impede the TMB's ability to define "serious
damage." Indeed, some frustrated exporting nations have asked that
textile disputes by-pass the TMB and proceed directly to the DSB. 94
189 See, e.g., Jim Ostroff, El Salvador, U.S. Resume Talks on Underwear Quotas, Import Quo-
tas, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, June 6, 1995, at 15 (during negotiations with countries called on
underwear imports, prior to the TMB hearing, one trade analyst stated that the United States
did not want to undergo TMB review because a majority of the TMB representatives, including
those from India and Pakistan, were outright hostile to U.S. textile policy).
If this degree of skepticism is warranted, then the protection ostensibly provided by the
transitional safeguard may prove to be a false promise to U.S. industries.
190 See Jim Ostroff, Caribbean Underwear Row Goes Back to WTO's Court, supra note 150.
In July 1995 the TMB recommended that the United States rescind a safeguard on nightwear
from Honduras. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. The United States refused to com-
ply with this recommendation until September 1995 when the United States reached an agree-
ment with Honduras regarding underwear, nightwear, and women's and girls' wool coats. See
U.S., Honduras Settle Underwear Quota Issue, supra note 132. Perhaps the United States was
using the nightwear issue as leverage in the negotiations over the other items.
191 Quota calls used to harass countries would violate the principle that transitional safe-
guards are to be used "as sparingly as possible," ATC, supra note 4, art. 6 para. 1, and only when
there is "serious damage" or "actual threat thereof." Id. art. 6, para. 2. The use of non quota
mechanisms as a pretext for limiting imports would violate ATC art. 7, para. 1. The injured
Member could bring a complaint before the relevant WTO body. Id. art. 7, para. 2-3. However,
proving that the U.S. actions in these areas were motivated by non-legitimate factors would
likely involve a showing of intent which would be inherently difficult to prove.
192 Id. art. 8, para. 10.
193 Costa Rica and India have both sought a DSB hearing in their disputes with the United
States. See supra notes 134-136, 173-177. However, the U.S. may have "political clout" with the
DSB. See Jim Ostroff, U.S., Honduras Negotiations Break Offi WTO Debate Seen on Underwear
Quota. World Trade Organization May Get Involved in Trade Dispute, WOMEN's WEAR DAILY,
August 15, 1995, at 30.
194 Eduardo Lachica and Bhushan Bahree, Pakistan, Textile Exporters Ask WTO Help in Dis-
pute, TmE AsIAN WALL S-mEEr JouINA., July 19, 1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL-WSJA
10218501.
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Some developed nations have stated that India's decision to appeal to
the DSB undermined the credibility of the TMB. 195 This would seem-
ingly occur if the DSB were to reverse the unanimous opinion of the
TMB in Woven Blouses.'96
The DSB acts as an appellate body for disputes before the
TMB.' 7 Therefore, if the TMB desires to have control over the defi-
nition of "serious damage," the TMB must reach decisions that are
either not appealed or are sound enough to be affirmed on appeal to
the DSB.
For the Members involved in a dispute, appealing to the DSB
involves time and costs. The DSB forms a three-person, ad hoc panel
to hear WTO disputes and has a seven-person standing body which
hears appeals from the panels.198 The DSB panel could take nine to
12 months to give a decision.' 99
A losing party has 60 days to appeal a panel decision, and the
DSB's Appellate Body then has 60 to 90 days to issue an opinion.200
The DSB has 30 days in which to accept or reject an Appellate Body
decision.2 10 The implementation period of a decision can then go to
arbitration, and arbitrators have a guideline that implementation is
not to exceed 15 months from the DSB's adoption of a panel or Ap-
pellate Body decision.20 2
Given the time involved in a DSB appeal and the fact that a
country can appeal to the DSB only after the TMB has provided a
recommendation and a reconsideration, 20 3 the DSB provides an ineffi-
cient resolution method relative to the TMB.201 "Serious damage"
could be done to the economy of a party to the dispute in the time
195 WTO Sets Panels, supra note 167.
196 The United States has rescinded the safeguard at issue in Women's Coats, one of the two
safeguards that India has appealed to the DSB. See supra notes 164-171 and accompanying text.
The TMB had not reached a consensus in Women's Coats, and so it would have seemingly been
easier for the DSB to decide the case in favor of India. Now India is in the difficult position of
appealing only a case in which the TMB unanimously decided in favor of the United States and,
thus, asking the DSB to directly conflict with the TMB.
197 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
198 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 92.
199 id- art. 12, at 1233-34.
200 Id. art. 17, at 1236-37.
201 Id.
202 Id. art. 21, at 1238-39.
203 ATC, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 10.
204 When a matter is brought to the TMB, the TMB is to "promptly conduct an investigation
of the matter" and "make appropriate recommendations to the Members concerned within 30
days." Id art. 6, para. 10. If a Member notifies the TMB that it does not intend to comply with
the TMB's recommendations, the TMB shall issue further recommendations "forthwith." Ild.
art. 8, para. 10.
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that it takes the DSB to issue an opinion. The speed and seemingly
lower legal fees associated with TMB review make it potentially supe-
rior to the DSB as a dispute settlement body.
B. A Vague Agreement
The GATT safeguard provision has historically been plagued by
flexible legal terms.2 °" There has been little GAIT jurisprudence to
define the escape clause.2°6 The text of the ATC does little to resolve
the traditional safeguard ambiguities. In the absence of a clear defini-
tion, a diverse international body with conflicting political interests
such as the TMB has naturally had difficulty agreeing whether the "se-
rious damage" standard has been demonstrated by particular case
facts.
The ATC does not define "serious damage" or "threat thereof,"
the requisite level of causal connection between imports and damage,
or the degree of attribution required for Members' products to receive
a safeguard. The ATC merely states that serious damage is to be de-
termined based on economic variables, but cautions that none of the
factors, alone or in combination, can give "decisive guidance. '20 7 The
ATC states that damage must be caused by imports but does not artic-
ulate the degree of causal connection required.0 8 The ATC also says
that safeguards are to be applied on a Member-by-Member basis; seri-
ous damage or an actual threat thereof must be attributed to a specific
Member in order to impose a safeguard on the Member's products.20 9
However, the ATC fails to define the degree of causal connection re-
quired for attribution. It merely lists four factors from which attribu-
tion can be inferred, but again with the caveat that "none of these
factors, either alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily
205 An example of the delay involved in having to resort to the DSB is provided by the Un-
derwear case in which case quotas have remained in place for approximately 16 months while
Costa Rica appealed to the TMB and then the DSB. Compare CITA Announces New Limits on
Underwear and Nightwear, supra note 116, with Cooper, supra note 136.
JACKSON, supra note 6, at 158-65. Safeguards are arguably included in trade agreements to
get an agreement completed, id. at 150-51, despite the fact that they lack predictability. Id. at
165.
206 Id. at 156 n.27, 163.
207 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 3. The agreement lists ten potentially relevant economic
variables: "output, productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, exports,
wages, employment, domestic prices, profits and investment."
208 Id. art. 6, para. 2.
209 Id. art. 6, para. 4. The four factors are "sharp and substantial increase in imports, actual or
imminent,... the level of imports as compared with imports from other countries, market share,
and import and domestic prices at a comparable stage of commercial transaction." Id. (fn.
omitted).
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give decisive guidance. ' 210 Thus, the ATC provides no rule of decision
for determining "serious damage."
The confusion that would reasonably be expected to result from
the ATC's indecisive language has in fact manifested itself in the early
TMB decisions, which have created an incoherent body of law.2
Both the United States and exporting nations have had difficulty dis-
cerning neutral economic principles underlying the TMB decisions ap-
plying the "serious damage" standard.212 Thus far, the United States,
through CITA, has disagreed with the TMB's assessment of what con-
stitutes "serious damage" in each of the six cases brought before the
TMB.213 Likewise, the TMB has struggled in reaching consensus
among its own members. In three of the cases, 50% of those decided
to date, the TMB has been unable to reach a consensus regarding
whether an actual threat of serious damage exists.2 14 The TMB has,
however, reached a consensus that no serious damage to industry ex-
isted in all six cases.215
An effective trade system requires two features: norm formula-
tion and dispute settlement.216 The TMB acts as a dispute settlement
body when it applies the "serious damage" norm. 7 However, the
text of the ATC is so vague that it does not dictate a meaningful norm.
There is debate regarding whether international trade law - GATT -
can or should provide truly meaningful norms.21 Some argue that
GATT provides a forum for "conciliation and negotiation" aimed at
preserving a balance of concessions and obligations based on
power.219 However, the trend is toward a "rule-oriented" approach to
international law which favors the development of substantive inter-
210 Id.
211 See Stewart Statement, supra note 111; see infra notes 236 to 245 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., id.; Frances Williams, News: World Trade: Poorer nations Plan Attack on Trade
Barriers, FN. TnmFis, July 25, 1996, World Trade News Section, at 5.
213 See Table II, supra Section III. The TMB has yet to agree with the United States that
there was "serious damage" caused to an industry. The TMB did find a threat of serious damage
in one case, Woven Blouses. ld.
214 It is of note that in those three cases - the two Underwear cases and Women's Coats - the
TMB's failure to reach a consensus has allowed the United States' unilaterally imposed safe-
guards to remain in place while the countries resume consultations; thus, the no-decisions have
arguably functioned as a near victory for U.S. restraints on international textile trade. See Wil-
liams, supra note 6.
215 See Table II supra Section III..
216 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 88.
217 See ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 10.
218 JACKSON, supra note 6, at 83-113.
219 Id.
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national legal rules.220 The ATC represents a clear step toward a rule-
oriented approach because it includes automatic review by the TMB
of any agreements reached following a call.221 However, the ambigu-
ity of the ATC and the TMB's associated difficulty in reaching deci-
sions has kept the TMB from performing the automatic review of
settlement agreements.'m If the ATC's promise of a more "rule-ori-
ented" approach to trade is to be realized, the TMB must develop a
more precise meaning of "serious damage," as recommended in sec-
tion V of this Comment.
C. Political Influences
In the absence of a well defined standard, the TMB members, as
well as the officials of the countries involved in the dispute, have sig-
nificant leeway in making determinations. Inevitably, given a choice
of defensible positions, decision-makers, despite their duty to serve in
an ad personam capacity,223 are influenced by the policy interests of
their home countries.2 24 The Member nations subscribed to this belief
when they nearly prevented the first WTO General Council meeting
from taking place due to conflict over which nations would appoint
individuals to serve on the TMB.225
220 Id. at 98. Most developing nations and many industrial nations, including the United
States, appear to favor a rule-oriented approach. Only the European Union opposes such an
approach. See id.
221 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 9. A "conciliation and negotiation" approach would, by
contrast, favor non-involvement by an international body once the parties had negotiated a set-
tlement. Cf. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 83-98.
222 See WTO Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65. The author has found no evidence of
TMB review of an agreement reached by Members. See, eg., Jim Ostroff, U.S., Guatemala
Agree on First Skirt Quotas, WOMEN's WEAR DAILY, November 3, 1995.
The TMB automatic review provision was arguably intended to make it unnecessary to for-
mally challenge an agreement to ensure that the ATC safeguard provision is not abused. WTO
Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65. This would seemingly aid developing nations which might
fear some form of retaliation for challenging an industrial nation.
The DSB panel opinion in Underwear, Cooper, supra note 136, may begin the process of
giving much needed definition to the standard. However, given that the Serious Damage deter-
mination depends on numerous economic factors, ATC, supra note 4, art 6, para. 2-4, many cases
are needed to define the standard.
223 See ATC, supra note 4, art. 8, para. 1.
224 Lachica and Bahree, supra note 194 (exporters accuse importing country TMB members
of being "'shamefacedly biased'); Jim Ostroff, supra note 189 (a majority of TMB members,
including those from India and Pakistan, are "outright hostile" to U.S. textile policy).
Even individuals who consciously attempt to adjudicate in an unbiased manner would seem-
ingly be biased by their experiences in their home country which inform their opinion of what
hardships are created by international trade and restraints thereof and, thus, affect their assess-
ment of Serious Damage.
225 See Kohi, supra note 99, at 14.
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Impartiality is critical to the efficacy of the TMB. The TMB can-
not enforce its decisions; it can only make recommendations.2 6
While countries generally prefer to abide by their international obliga-
tions, trade matters are highly political and are subject to domestic
opposition.227 Adverse decisions by the TMB are more likely to be
accepted domestically if the TMB is seen as unbiased.228 Given the
TMB's lack of enforcement powers, domestic acceptance is needed to
achieve enforcement. 9
The TMB decisions to date validate the suspicions of the skeptics,
to a degree; however, the decisions also suggest a willingness by TMB
members to search for a neutral standard and to make principled deci-
sions. The TMB has at times demonstrated an ability to overcome
political differences and reach consensus. In two cases before the
TMB that did not involve the "serious damage" standard, the TMB
has achieved consensus, deciding one case in favor of the United
States and one in favor of Hong Kong.230
The TMB members have also overcome political interests to
reach unanimous decisions in several "serious damage" cases. Do-
mestic textile producers in industrial nations are generally likely to be
harmed by textile imports. A decision against an importing (devel-
oped) nation is likely to create a "serious damage" precedent which
negatively affects all importing nations' textile and apparel indus-
tries.231 Therefore, the representatives from the industrial nations
presumably voted against the interests of their nations' domestic tex-
tile producers when they voted in all six cases that serious damage had
not yet been done to a domestic industry and in two of the six cases
(Nightwear and Men's Suits) that there was no threat of serious dam-
age.232 Similarly, the finding that imports in Woven Blouses posed a
threat of serious damage suggests a willingness by the members ap-
226 See supra notes 90 to 92.
227 Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over
Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 408-10 (1995). See also Williams, supra note 6 (there are strong
anti-WTO forces in the U.S. Congress). Textile trade is a very contentious issue that is impor-
tant to both developing and developed countries. See id.; see also supra notes 99 to 108 and
accompanying text.
228 See Young, supra note 227.
229 See id.
230 See TMB Rules for U.S. on Macao Denim Quota, DALY NEws RECORD, June 11, 1996, at
3; WTO Rules for Hong Kong in Wool Dispute With the U.S., RPumtErs, Sept. 29, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN File.
231 See supra notes 179 to 184.
232 The TMB delegate from Japan reportedly provided data that was critical to disproving
CITA's position in one case. See Ostroff, supra note 28, at 5. Japan is a developed nation, and so
these actions would seem to be contrary to its interest.
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pointed by developing nations to look beyond political interests. That
TMB members in these cases did not simply vote based on the goals
of their countries indicates a willingness of the TMB to search for neu-
tral principles in defining "serious damage.
23 3
While a search for neutral principles may be occurring, the deter-
mination of the "serious damage" standard is affected by the policy
interests of the countries which appoint the TMB members. In the
Underwear cases, while the TMB unanimously found no serious dam-
age, the TMB split along national economic-stage-of-development
lines in attempting to decide whether there was an actual threat of
serious damage. The five members appointed by developing nations
found that their was no threat of serious damage, while four members
appointed by industrial nations found that there was a threat of seri-
ous damage.23 4 Thus, it appears that while the TMB members take
their duty seriously and the TMB has reached consensus on the stan-
dard in certain cases, the vagueness of the standard and the inevitable
political interest of TMB members combine to produce uncertainty
and politically based conflict. 23 5
D. Distinguishing Cases to Define the Standard
The "serious damage" standard remains undefined. The TMB
has failed to reach agreement in fifty percent of its cases. Even in the
cases in which the TMB has made a decision, its reasoning is unavaila-
ble, which limits the ability to use prior decisions to predict future
determinations. 236 However, by examining the available facts and the
holding of each case, perhaps the penumbra of the contours of what
constitutes "serious damage" can be seen.
The TMB decisions to date have yet to find a case of "serious
damage." Thus, the ability to infer from the cases where the serious
damage "zone" begins is limited. The most that can be said is that
233 See Jim Ostroff and John Zarocostas, Importers, U.S. Makers Accept TMB Underwear
Ruling, DAILY NEWS REC, July 25, 1995, at 4. Brenda Jacobs, former senior counsel for textiles
and trade agreements at the U.S. Department of Commerce, stated that the Underwear decision
shows the TMB takes the Serious Damage determination seriously and that this will force the
United States to reconsider the economic basis on which it has grounded unilateral quotas. Id.
234 See generally id. Members from India, Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil voted
that there was no threat of serious damage. Members from Canada, the European Union, Japan,
and Norway found a threat of serious damage.
235 Opinions differ as to whether the TMB favors the policy interests of developed or devel-
oping nations. See, eg., supra note 224.
236 WTO Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65 (Cryptic two or three sentence conclusory
statements do not provide interested persons with an understanding of why the particular con-
clusion was reached. Nor do they provide a useful precedent for future decisions.).
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serious damage is more severe than the industry damage presented in
Woven Blouses, where the TMB found an actual threat of serious dam-
age.237 Based on this case, a finding of serious damage will require a
dramatic decline in production and market share, accompanied by sig-
nificant job loss, or some equivalent combination of economic facts.23 8
Thus, it appears that serious damage requires severe economic facts.
As to when a threat of serious damage exists, Woven Blouses as
well as Underwear and Women's Coats are instructive. In Woven
Blouses a threat of serious damage was found, but it is not clear
whether that case marks the minimum degree of damage necessary to
establish a threat, the threshold amount of damage before actual seri-
ous damage is recognized, or whether it is more representative of a
middle range of threatened serious damage.239 The economic facts
presented by the United States were materially worse in Woven
Blouses than in Underwear and Women's Coats, in which cases the
TMB was not able to reach a consensus on the threat of serious dam-
age.24 Thus, for at least some TMB members, the Woven Blouses
facts appear to be well within the threat of serious damage range and
possibly near the actual serious damage zone.
There is significant discord among TMB members, however, as to
where the threat of serious damage zone begins. Underwear suggests
that for some TMB members a moderate decline in U.S. production in
consecutive years may indicate a threat of serious damage.241 Wo-
237 See supra notes 171 to 178. The countries involved in the six Serious Damage cases with
the United States are developing countries. See Curtiss & Atkinson, supra note 28, at 119 (all
WTO Members in Central and South America are developing countries); Baj Bhala, Tragedy,
Irony, and Protectionism after BCCI: A Three-Act Play Starring Maharajah Bank, 48 SMU L.
REv. 11, 48 (1994) (India is a developing country). It is of note that least developed nations and
certain other categories of countries are to receive more favorable treatment in the application
of safeguards, which further limits the value of the vague precedents discussed herein.
238 See WovEN BLousEs Sinous DAMAGE, supra note 170. U.S. production declined
12.5%, market share dropped 36.1%, and 6.2% of category jobs were lost in the most recent
twelve month period.
It is also notable that in this case total imports had risen by 95.8% and well exceeded the
amount of domestic production for the most recent twelve months. Indian imports rose by
414% and India was the largest exporter of these goods. Thus, the link between domestic indus-
try damage and imports, and attribution of harm to Indian imports in particular was strongly
established.
239 See supra notes 171 to 178.
240 Compare id. with Underwear, supra notes 115 to 136, and Women's Coats, supra notes 159
to 169.
241 UNDERWEAR SINUous DAMAGE, supra note 66 (a 3.8% decline in 1993 and a 3.5% de-
cline in the first nine months of 1994). A DSB panel has determined that serious damage was
not shown in the Underwear case. Cooper, supra note 136. However, the DSB panel decision
may have been based more on the United States' quotas settlements with other countries called
than on the actual economic data on the U.S. industry. See id. Thus, the panel opinion, when
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men's Coats indicates that significant job loss over a two year period
may reflect a threat to an industry.242 However, the inability of the
TMB to reach a consensus in these cases indicates that the individual
TMB members have differing definitions of the standard. 43
The line between the threat of serious damage and an absence
thereof is both informed and muddled by a comparison between
Men's Coats, where the TMB found no serious damage or threat
thereof, and Underwear, where there was no consensus on the threat
of serious damage.244 Because the cases are similar but produced dif-
fering outcomes, they indicate that the threat of serious damage be-
gins somewhere in the range indicated by the facts of the two cases.
However, the cases are so similar that they are difficult to distinguish;
for example, U.S. production declines and job losses were actually
slightly worse in the most recent period in Men's Coats.2 45 A compar-
ison of these cases suggests that there is some measure of arbitrariness
in TMB determinations, illustrates that the standard is unacceptably
vague, and demonstrates the need for the publication of reasoned
opinions by the T1MB to explain its decisions.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The TMB is responsible for interpreting and controlling the ap-
plication of the safeguards.246 This is a significant duty; TMB deci-
sions impact the large and imperiled U.S. textile and apparel
industries2 47 as well as those of developing countries. 248 In the face of
available, may or may not shed meaningful light on the economic facts which constitute serious
damage.
242 WOMEN'S COATS SERous DAMAGE, supra note 159. An estimated 16.2% of category
jobs were lost over a two year period.
243 This is a plausible, though not the only, explanation. In the absence of written, reasoned
opinions from the TMB it is not clear what the TMB members based their decisions on. An-
other possible explanation of the disagreement is that the members made different fact findings.
244 This DSB panel's opinion that there was no threat of serious damage in Undewear, de-
pending on the panels reasoning, may bring some clarity to this issue. See supra note 241.
While the panel's opinion may well be useful in determining what fails to constitute a threat
of serious damage, the number of factors involved in a Serious Damage detemination, ATC,
supra note 4, art. 6, para. 2-4, should make it necessary to decide numerous cases in order to
define the Serious Damage standard.
245 Similarly, compare MEN'S COAT SERious DAMAGE, supra note 152, with WOMEN'S
COATS SERious DAMAGE, supra note 159. The U.S. industry fared worse in terms of production
decline and market share loss in Men's Coats. The U.S. industry fared worse in terms of job loss
in Women's Coats. The TMB found no threat of serious damage in Men's Coats but could not
reach a consensus on the threat of serious damage in Women's Coats. It is difficult to determine
why the TMB reached differing results in the cases based on the available economic data.
246 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 10; art. 8.
247 See supra notes 44 to 63 and accompanying text.
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the consequent political differences and pressure, and with only a
vague standard to guide it,249 the TMB has not been able to carry out
its responsibility under the ATC.25 °
The TMB needs to establish itself as a predictable and impartial
decision making body when making "serious damage" determinations.
A predictable TMB would facilitate efficient negotiations between
Members involved in safeguard disputes. An impartial TMB would
provide Member countries the market access and domestic industry
protection which the ATC promises. The following recommendations
would assist the attainment of these goals.
A. Define the Standard Through Published, Reasoned Opinions
In order to create predictability and to reduce the influence of
politics on TMB decision making, the TMB should define the "serious
damage" standard by providing reasoned opinions for its decisions.
The vagueness of the ATC's articulation of the standard, 251 the con-
flicting policy interest of the countries which appoint TMB mem-
bers, 252 and the fact that TMB membership will change annually,25 3
make precedent essential for the TMB to achieve consistency and
continuity.
25 4
Reasoned opinions could give definition to the standard and cre-
ate a predictor of future TMB decisions. The opinions should state the
significant facts as the TMB found them, set forth the applicable legal
principles, and explain why those facts did or did not indicate serious
248 See generally supra note 6.
249 See supra notes 205 to 215 and accompanying text.
250 The TMB has failed to review any safeguard agreements reached by Members, see supra
note 222, and has failed to reach a decision in three of the six cases it has attempted to decided
based on the Serious Damage standard. See supra notes 211 to 222 and accompanying text.
The current approach of the TMB may lead to a delegation of the TMB's responsibility for
Serious damage determinations to the DSB. This is not desirable because (1) appeal to the DSB
is time consuming for the parties involved in the matter, see supra notes 198 to 204 and accompa-
nying text, (2) it would likely take many DSB opinions to flesh out a legal definition of Serious
Damage and so heavy reliance on the DSB for precedent would render the TMB ineffective until
several DSB decisions were issued, which would likely be an extended period of time, and (3) as
a formal matter, the ATC assigns responsibility for Serious Damage determinations to the TMB.
See supra notes 86 to 92.
251 See supra notes 205 to 222 and notes 236 to 245 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 223 to 235 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
254 WTO Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65.
Because the text of the ATC does not define Serious Damage, the early decisions of the
ATC will inherently involve policy choices in establishing the serious damage "zone." However,
once early precedents are established, future TMB decisions would begin to have objective
guidelines to follow which would be continually refined through case law.
In Search of a Standard: "Serious Damage"
17:272 (1996)
damage or a threat thereof.5 5 Because the factors that are to be con-
sidered in making the "serious damage" determination are generally
quantified, findings of fact combined with reasoned opinions could
provide a very useful road map for Members involved in transitional
safeguard considerations. Before taking action, Members could com-
pare their economic factors to the factors found to be most persuasive
by the TMB in past decisions and, to a reasonable degree, assess how
the TMB would decide the matter. Increased certainty would pro-
mote more efficient decision-making and lessen the ability of Mem-
bers to credibly threaten improper safeguard measures or to oppose
valid ones in their negotiations.
256
The TMB faces a unique challenge in selecting a judicial model
for its opinions. DSB panels and appellate bodies follow traditional
GATT practices of issuing a single opinion by the decision making
body without expression of individual views.25 7 However, given the
size and diversity of the TMB, it may be useful to allow TMB mem-
bers to express individual opinions. TMB members might be more
willing to reach consensus if they are allowed to state the grounds for
their agreement in a concurring opinion. In cases in which no consen-
sus is reached, it would be useful to have disagreeing TMB members
articulate their positions because this would impose discipline on
TMB members,25 8 give interested Members insight into the TMB's
view of the serious damage "zone,' '25 9 and provide a foundation for
possible review by the DSB. An approximate representative model
for this procedure could be the U.S. court system with its custom of
decisions for the court, concurrences, and dissents. 260 The drawback
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., supra note 182.
257 IMPLEMENTING BILL, supra note 5, at 1014.
258 TMB members would be forced to support their opinions on economically principled ba-
ses, or risk having their political motivations exposed. while requiring opinions would not en-
sure principled decision making, (i.e., opinions could state mere pretexts for the real factors
affecting decisions, place undue weight on one side's version of the facts in order to justify a legal
result, etc.), the process would impose some discipline and would be a significant improvement
over the current process.
259 This insight could give guidance to Members involved in other safeguard negotiations and
those considering safeguard actions.
260 Because the TMB reaches decisions by consensus, the equivalent of a dissent would occur
when the TMB could not reach an opinion and members stated the grounds for their opinions in
separate opinions. Under these circumstances, there would essentially be only individual dis-
sents and there would be no opinion of the TMB.
Issuing individual opinions would conflict with the traditional practice of GATT dispute
settlement panels. IMNLENEN Nr Bxu_, supra note 5, at 1014. As an alternative model, the
TMB could possibly utilize its freedom to create its own working procedures, ATC, supra note 4,
art. 8, para. 2, to create small dispute panels, like the DSB panels, which would then issue reports
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of this approach is that it makes conflict within the TMB a matter of
public record. However, given that insiders frequently know how
TMB members vote even under the current procedures,26 1 it seems
that issuing written opinions would cause only limited loss of privacy
for the TMB. The incremental friction created by this procedure
would be significantly outweighed by the improved rigor of the deci-
sion making process and the creation of useful precedent.
B. Openness
The TMB should increase the openness of its proceedings. In-
creased transparency in the WTO has been has a goal of the Clinton
administration and was partially realized in July of 1996 when the
WTO decided to begin making most of its documents publicly avail-
able immediately.262 Openness allows Members to "gain a better un-
derstanding of how the WTO works and the reasons underlying
actions that Members take. ' 263 To improve the credibility of its deci-
sion making processes - and thus the legitimacy of its results - the
TMB, like the WTO, should increase the transparency of its
operations. 26
TMB proceedings are currently closed door affairs; the TMB
does not even circulate agendas of its meetings.265 Additionally, the
TMB restricts its opinions to Members who are parties to the contro-
versy,266 and recommends that interested parties request opinions
from their domestic government.267 However, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative's Office and the Department of Commerce Office of Textiles
and Apparel refuse to distribute TMB decisions.268
that would be adopted by the TMB unless there was a consensus on the TMB to not adopt the
report.
261 Ostroff and Zarocostas, supra note 233.
262 WTO Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65.
263 Id. (quoting the acting U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky).
264 Id.
265 Ostroff and Zarocostas, supra note 233; Hong Kong Urges TMB to Reveal Reasons for Its
Recommendations, DAILY NEWS RECORD, Dec. 22, 1995, at 12.
266 Telephone interview, TMB Official (anonymity requested), Nov. 15, 1995.
The TMB is to communicate its findings "to the Members directly concerned. All such
recommendations or findings shall also be communicated to the Council for Trade in Goods for
its information." ATC, supra note 4, art. 8. para. 8. This language, however, does not preclude
giving information to other parties.
267 Telephone interview, supra note 266.
268 In various phone interviews, members of these offices stated that the TMB requires that
its proceedings and decisions remain confidential.
Nevertheless, the author has read one of the TMB serious damage case recommendations.
It included only a general summary of each party's claims (less than one-half page devoted to
each side) and the TMB's holding. The decision contained no indication of which aspects of law
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The first step toward increased openness is the already discussed
issuance of meaningful, written opinions. Additional steps should also
be taken. TMB hearings should be open to interested persons, and
the final briefs of both parties before the TMB should be made avail-
able to the public.2 69 This would promote greater understanding of
the definition of "serious damage" by all countries and by industry
representatives, which would in turn lead to greater predictability in
application of the transitional safeguard measure.
Making these documents publicly available would also serve as a
check on the influence of politics on decision-making. A TMB mem-
ber or members who either provided poorly reasoned explanations for
their decisions or who choose to provide no reasoning at all would
have their political influences revealed to the public. While this would
not force members to make impartial decisions, it would certainly cre-
ate some pressure to do so.
Openness is also needed in order to increase the sense of legiti-
macy and fairness in TMB decision-making.2 70 Openness is a hall-
mark of a decision-making body which bases its opinions on legitimate
factors and reason. 271 The specter of back room meetings producing
edicts without supporting reasoning undercuts the credibility of the
TMB. The international nature of the TM3 decisions, with the natu-
ral attendant suspicion that political influences will subvert principle,
makes it particularly important that the TMB establish credibility.272
The TMB might resist openness because, based on the inability to
reach decisions in fifty percent of its cases thus far, it would likely
reveal a significant conflict and uncertainty in the TMB's decision-
or fact the TMB found to be most significant to its decision nor did it otherwise provide the
reasoning for the decision. A U.S. agency official made the document available for the author to
read in the official's office but would not allow the decision to be copied. The official stated that
the document was representative of TMB decisions. The author has spoken with numerous U.S.
officials who have confirmed that other TMB decisions contain no meaningful analysis. See also
WTO Meeting in Singapore, supra note 65 (referring to TMB decisions as cryptic two or three
sentence decisions). Given the sparseness of the documents, the TMB and the U.S. agency offi-
cials make much ado about nothing in refusing to distribute TMB serious damage case decisions.
269 This would break with traditional GATT practice of keeping all party submissions to a
dispute panel confidential. IMPLEMENTING BILL, supra note 5, at 1014-15. However, if the TMB
and other GATT dispute settlement bodies are to overcome the cynicism about the effectiveness
and integrity of international law, see Jackson, supra note 8, at 23-24, it may be necessary to
increase the openness of procedures and, thereby, encourage a more principled decision making
process.
270 Young, supra note 227.
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making process. However, the TMB's failure to reach decisions has
already revealed that it is in conflict. Given the international repre-
sentation on the TMB, the TMB might be particularly sensitive to the
possibility of having members from different countries publicly em-
barrassed. But, TMB members could be urged to show some discre-
tion in their comments and perhaps, as in U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, an occasional acrimonious tone should not cause a level of
damage that would be expected to impair decision-making.
Scrutiny and outside criticism would be good for the decision-
making process. Openness would not force the TMB to cede any por-
tion of its autonomy to outside inquirers; it would, however, cause the
TMB to occasionally evaluate its processes and decisions in light of
outside observations. While uncomfortable for the TMB members,
this would likely be a healthy process that would provide an incentive
for TMB members to make neutral, thoughtful decisions and also pro-
vide the body with potentially useful criticism.273
C. Presumptions
The large number of economic variables that factor into a "seri-
ous damage" determination will make it difficult to define the stan-
dard even with the aid of precedent. To remedy this, after hearing
enough cases to develop a sense of the "serious damage" standard, the
TMB should state in its opinions figures which it finds create a rebut-
table presumption of serious damage or threat thereof, causation by
imports, and attribution to an individual Member.
The ATC states that serious damage to an industry is to be as-
sessed by examining changes in "output, productivity, utilization of
capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, do-
mestic prices, profits and investment decisions." But the health of an
industry can essentially be assessed by examining changes in output
and profitability. All of the factors listed in the ATC are either largely
determined by or reflected by these two variables. Changes in output
largely determine changes in employment, profits, and investment.
273 Exporting nations have complained about the TMB's "lack of transparency and impartial-
ity." Williams, supra note 212. Hong Kong and India, in particular, have criticized the TMB's
secrecy. See Williams, supra note 6, at 4. Likewise, the United States has called on the WTO to
open up its debates and to agree on a code of conduct. WTO Should Have More Open Debate,
Ethical Code of Conduct, Lang Says, 50 INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) 2093 (Dec. 20, 1995), avail-
able in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, BNAITD File (hereinafter Open Debate).
Thus, while importing and exporting countries may differ strongly on the meaning of Seri-
ous Damage in the ATC, it appears that the major parties would agree that the standard can best
be defined in an open process which ventilates the issues.
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Output largely reflects changes in productivity, utilization of capacity,
market share, and exports. Profits affect investment
274 and wages275
and reflect the impact of imports on domestic prices and changes in
inventories.2 7 6 Over an extended period of time, changes in output
would either reflect or cause changes in the other factors.
An example of possible factors creating a presumption of serious
damage or a threat thereof is as follows:
TABLE III: SERIOUS DAMAGE PRESUMPTION GRID
Profits (b)(c)
<3% 3%-5% >5%
No serious No serious No serious
damage or damage or damage or
Increase threat threat threat
No serious No serious
Decline of less Threat of seri- damage or damage or
Changes in Output (a) than 3% ous damage threat threat
Decline of No serious
between 3% Serious dam- Threat of seri- damage or
and 5% age ous damage threat
Decline of
greater than Serious dam- Threat of seri- Threat of seri-
5% age ous damage ous damage
(a) In most recent twelve month period measured.
(b) Defined as operating income (income before interest, taxes, and extraordinary items) as a
percentage of sales during the most recent twelve month period measured.
(c) These figures could be derived by determining the average operating income for the indus-
try over the previous five years; this average and the average minus 2% could create the
bounds for the middle category.
Similarly, a presumption of a causal connection between serious
damage or the actual threat thereof should be established by some
274 This is based on the reasoning that there is positive relationship between historical profits
and anticipated future profits, afTom COPELAND, Tim KOLLER, & JACK MURRIN, VALUATION:
MEASURING AND MANAGiNG Tiii VALUE OF CoMPANas 120, 156 (stating that a sound under-
standing of past performance is the basis of developing a forecast for the future and using the
most recent historical year as a base for projections of the future), and a rational investor would
only be expected to invest in an industry which was expected to provide an acceptable future
return on investment. See RiCHARD A. BREALEY & STmwARD C. MYEns, 47-125 (4th ed. 1991).
Note, however, that accounting profits may not always be equal to economic returns. Id. at 261-
78.
275 This is based upon the theory that unprofitable firms are less likely to grant wage increases
and more likely to seek wage concessions from employees. af ROBERT E. HALL & JoHN B.
TAYLOR, MAcRO-ECONOMIcs: THEORY, PERFoRMANCE, AND PoUcy 428 (under contract the-
ory, parties to contracts of over one year should seek to include contingencies for higher profits;
also noting that firms engaged in wage negotiations may have an incentive to claim to workers
that profits are low).
276 Increasing inventories may be an indication that goods are not selling, and, if so, this fact
should be reflected by a decline in profitability.
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quantified measure. For example, if for the most recent full year pe-
riod, the increase in total imports minus the increase in total market
size exceeds five percent of the total domestic output for the period,
then a causal connection between total imports and serious damage or
the threat thereof would exist.
Once serious damage or the threat thereof and the causal connec-
tion with total imports has been established, damage must be "attrib-
uted" to an individual Member on the basis of a "sharp and
substantial increase in imports, actual or imminent" and "the level of
imports as compared with imports from other sources, market share,
and import and domestic prices."2 77 The TMB should again establish
some figure which would constitute a presumption of attribution. For
example, if a Member's increase in imports represents more than 5%
of the increase in total imports then attribution would be presumed.
For countries that are to receive "more favorable" treatment, this fig-
ure could be raised to 10%.278
In describing the factors which determine serious damage or the
threat thereof and the factors which determine attribution to an indi-
vidual Member, the ATC states that none of these factors "either
alone or combined with other factors, can necessarily give decisive
guidance." 279 It is not clear what it means to "necessarily give decisive
guidance," but it seems clear that the ATC prohibits the creation of
definitive decision rules. The TMB will likely hear unique and com-
plex cases. Inevitably, many cases will merit and should receive a de-
cision counter to that suggested by a scheme of presumptions. This,
however, does not deny the value or the validity of a simplified, quan-
tified scheme of presumptions. The above proposal would not violate
the letter or spirit of the ATC. Rather it would merely create rebutta-
ble presumptions that would provide much needed guidance both to
the TMB and to Member countries and, thus, facilitate a more pre-
dictable and impartial decision-making process.
CONCLUSION
The TMB has failed to create a coherent body of law interpreting
the "serious damage" standard. Unless the TMB improves its per-
formance, faith in its processes will be diminished, and traders will
increasingly find alternate methods of dealing with dispute - including
appealing to the DSB or violating international trade law.
277 ATC, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 4.
278 Id. art. 6, para 6.
279 Id. art. 6, para. 3-4.
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The TMB could increase its credibility and develop a more politi-
cally neutral "serious damage" standard by making procedural
changes. In order to define the standard and to inform interested par-
ties as to the meaning of the standard, the TMB should publish rea-
soned opinions for its decisions and accept the discipline which such a
process would impose. In order to increase the sense of legitimacy in
T1MB decision-making and to better ventilate the issues, the TMB
should open up its procedures. Finally, to give greater precision and
neutrality to decisions, the TMB should set forth economic facts which
create a rebuttable presumption of "serious damage." These proce-
dural changes should enable the TMB to better define the substantive
standard and to more effectively manage the implementation of the
ATC.
